A Statutory Approach to Partner Dissociation by Ribstein, Larry E.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 65 Issue 2 
1987 
A Statutory Approach to Partner Dissociation 
Larry E. Ribstein 
University of Illinois School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Larry E. Ribstein, A Statutory Approach to Partner Dissociation, 65 WASH. U. L. Q. 357 (1987). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
A STATUTORY APPROACH TO PARTNER
DISSOCIATION
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 359
II. THE ROLE AND APPROACH OF THE STATUTE ............ 360
A. The Functions of a Statutory Standard Form ......... 360
B. Devising An Appropriate Standard Form .............. 362
III. ELEMENTS AND METHODS OF DISSOCIATION ............ 364
A. Defining Dissociation ................................ 364
B. Methods of Achieving Partner Dissociation ............ 366
1. In General ...................................... 366
2. Transfer ........................................ 366
3. Buyout and Liquidation ......................... 367
4. Dissolution ...................................... 368
IV. PARTNER DISSOCIATION UNDER THE U.P.A ............. 368
A. Dissociation by Dissolution ........................... 368
B. Termination of Obligations to Co-Partners ............ 369
C. Termination of Obligations as to Post-Dissociation
D ebts ............................................... 369
D. Termination of Obligations as to Pre-Dissolution
D ebts .............................................. 370
E. Termination of Capital Contribution ................. 372
F Alternative Methods of Achieving Dissociation under
the UP.A.: Transfer, Buyout and Liquidation ......... 372
1. Transfer ........................................ 372
2. Liquidation ..................................... 373
3. Buyout .......................................... 375
G. Sum m ary ........................................... 376
V. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF ACHIEV-
ING DISSOCIATION ...................................... 377
A. In General .......................................... 377
* Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. The author gratefully ac-
knowledges the helpful comments of Alan Bromberg, William Carney, Victor Goldberg, John Heth-
erington, Robert Hillman, and Robert Thompson.
Washington University Open Scholarship
358 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
B. Buyout: Traditional Bases of the Buyout Right ........ 377
C. Evaluation of Buyout Right .......................... 379
1. In General ...................................... 379
2. Benefits of Buyout Right ......................... 380
a. Control of Agency and Coordination Costs ... 380
b. Other Benefits ............................... 383
3. The Costs of the Buyout Right ................... 384
a. The Risk of Takeover ........................ 384
b. Other Costs ................................. 388
4. Balancing Costs-and Benefits ..................... 389
5. Suggested Approach ............................. 392
D. Liquidation Right ................................... 392
1. The Benefits of Liquidation ...................... 392
2. The Costs of the Liquidation Right ............... 393
3. Balancing Costs and Benefits ..................... 395
4. When Liquidation is Appropriate ................. 396
E. Liquidation with Discharge .......................... 398
F. Dissolution .......................................... 400
1. The Benefits of Dissolution ....................... 400
2. The Costs of Dissolution ......................... 401
3. Suggested Approach ............................. 401
VI. AGREED TERM OR UNDERTAKING ...................... 403
A. Penalizing Premature Dissociation .................... 403
B. Premature Dissociation Without Penalty .............. 404
L In General ...................................... 404
2. Disabled and Bankrupt Partners ................. 405
3. Other Partners .................................. 406
C. What is an Agreed Term or Undertaking? ............ 408
D. Summary ........................................... 409
VII. CONTRACTING AROUND THE STANDARD FORM:
PROHIBITING DISSOCIATION ............................. 410
A. Defining the Issues .................................. 410
B. Evaluation of Reasons For Non-Enforcement of
Prohibitions on Withdrawal .......................... 411
1. Distinctions Between Corporation and Partnership . 411
2. Providing for Unanticipated Costs of Illiquidity .... 412
3. The Incorporation Option ........................ 414
C. The Judicial "Escape Valve" . ....................... 414
VIII. SUGGESTED DISSOCIATION PROVISIONS .................. 416
[Vol. 65:357
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss2/3
PARTNER DISSOCIATION
Section 1.01: Events of Dissociation ..................... 417
Com m ents .............................................. 419
Section 1.02: Rights of Dissociated Partner to Value of In-
terest and Indemnification ................. 420
Com m ent ............................................... 421
Section 1.03: Dissociating Partner's Power to Bind the
Partnership and Liability to Third Persons
after Dissociation ........................ 422
Com m ent ............................................... 422
Section 1.04: Sale of Assets ............................. 422
Com m ents .............................................. 423
Section 1.05: Winding Up ............................... 424
Com m ent ............................................... 424
Section 1.06: Dissolution of the Partnership ............. 425
Com m ents .............................................. 425
Comments on Other U.P.A. Dissolution Provisions ....... 426
IX. CONCLUSION ........................................... 426
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
has decided to revise the Uniform Partnership Act (U.P.A.). Therefore,
the time is ripe for reexamination of this venerable uniform law.' This
Article will recommend reform of one of the most distinctive features of
general partnership2 under the U.P.A.-the easy dissolvability of the
partnership entity.3
Revising the U.P.A. dissolution provisions creates the problem of find-
1. The Uniform Partnership Act was completed in 1914 and has been adopted in 49 states.
See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT, 6 U.L.A. I (Supp. 1986) (hereinafter U.P.A.).
2. This article will not deal with limited partnerships. As is discussed throughout this article,
the personal liability of general partners (i.e., their contribution of credit to the partnership) is signif-
icant in determining appropriate statutory dissociation provisions. Thus, very different provisions
may be appropriate for limited partners. Moreover, the potential tensions between the interests of
general and limited partners and the fact that the limited partnership statute may have to be
designed to accomodate publicly held firms (compare Section II [B] below concerning general part-
nerships) may require treating general partners in limited partnerships differently from those in gen-
eral partnerships.
3. The term "entity" is used in this Article to refer to the particular relationship that dissolves
under the Uniform Partnersip Act on the occurrence of dissociation of a partner or other dissolution
cause. The partnership "entity" in this sense is distinguished from the underlying business which
may continue with new management after dissolution. For a further discussion of the aggregate-
entity issue, see infra text accompanying notes 144-47.
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ing a middle ground between two extremes. Complete illiquidity of part-
nership interests is unsuited to the partnership standard form. Most
people would hesitate to make partnership-type commitments, often in-
cluding substantial investments of human and financial capital and per-
sonal credit, without being able to react to changes in risk by terminating
their commitments. Because free transferability of partner property
rights is not feasible, dissolution at will provides an important escape
route. But dissolution at will gives the dissolving partner the power to
appropriate firm assets and inflict significant costs on the other partners.
Thus, the U.P.A. escape route amounts to handing each partner a cache
of dynamite.
Because I intend to propose specific statutory provisions rather than
merely to describe the relevant policy considerations, Part II begins with
an analysis of the role and general approach of the partnership statute.
Part III defines the problem of permitting partner "dissociation" and
identifies some possible statutory approaches, including transfer of inter-
ests, buyout, liquidation and dissolution. Part IV describes the U.P.A.
dissolution provisions in the context of the alternative approaches to
partner dissociation.
Part V analyzes the costs and benefits of the various statutory ap-
proaches to partner dissociation identified in Part III. Part V concludes,
in light of the costs of illiquidity, that the parties would prefer a standard
form that provides for partner dissociation at will to one that does not.
However, the power to dissociate at will should be designed to minimize
such costs of high liquidity as opportunistic conduct by dissociating part-
ners and as disruption of the going concern.
Parts VI and VII discuss how the statute should deal with partner
dissociation in the face of relevant provisions in the partnership agree-
ment. Part VIII summarizes my findings in the form of proposed statu-
tory provisions concerning partner dissociation. The proposed statute
embodies a "scalpel" approach that better balances the costs and benefits
of partner dissociation than does the U.P.A. "dynamite" approach of
dissolution at will.
II. THE ROLE AND APPROACH OF THE STATUTE
A. The Functions of a Statutory Standard Form
Dissolution and continuation provisions are standard elements of a
partnership agreement. Providing for partner exit at the formation stage
[Vol. 65:357
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or at a time prior to when exit actually occurs, permits the partners to
determine how to handle exit in a calm and deliberative atmosphere,
before they know who will gain and lose from a particular rule, and
before negotiating positions are fixed. By such mechanisms as control-
ling the amount paid to a departing partner and the method of payment,
the partners can adjust the level of liquidity to the circumstances of their
particular business.4
If the parties can and do include dissociation provisions in their part-
nership agreements, why have a statute? A statutory standard form acts
as a mechanism for reducing the costs of entering into a partnership rela-
tionship.5 These costs include the time spent by the parties and their
lawyers, the risk that haggling over details will cause the relationship to
founder at the formation stage,6 and the costs resulting from error in
formulating the parties' agreement.7 The costs of entering into a partner-
ship relationship are likely to be quite substantial because of the long-
term nature of the arrangement and the many details attending the en-
forcement of and compensation for the partners' various contributions to
the firm.8 Although private parties can develop standard forms, statutory
forms encourage judicial development of an official meaning that reduces
formulation error.9
The partnership statute is also valuable in regulating relations between
the partners and third parties because it would be costly for the partners
to negotiate specialized terms with numerous creditors. That is particu-
larly true of relatively small and short-term credit transactions where the
transaction costs of specialized agreements are large in relation to the
size of the transactions.
4. Some contractual alternatives are discussed infra notes 121-24.
5. The costs and problems involved in drafting a partnership agreement are explored in Hill-
man, Private Ordering Within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 433-442 (1987).
6. This has been referred to as the risk of "queering the deal." See W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE,
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE, 63-65 (2d ed. 1986). See also Hetherington and Dooley,
Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Prob-
lem, 63 VA. L. REv. 1, 37 (1977); Hillman, supra note 5, at 435, n. 29.
7. These formulation errors have been considered to be a primary factor in the development of
standard terms. They include administrative errors (such as typographical errors), ambiguity, in-
completeness, inconsistency, interpretation error, and formulations that do not suit the parties' rela-
tionship. See Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions
Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 265-73 (1985).
8. As to the difficulties of contracting for buyout in the analogous close corporation setting,
see Hetherington and Dooley, supra note 6, at 36-38.
9. See Goetz and Scott, supra note 7, at 288.
1987]
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Of course, the courts can apply "off-the-rack" rules to partnership dis-
putes even without a partnership statute. In the present context, the
courts would supply these rules largely from the common law of agency.
For example, a partnership, if it were not distinguished from other
agency relationships, would be terminable at will unless deemed to be an
agency coupled with an interest.' 0 A partnership statute offers the ad-
vantages of predictability and of rules that are better suited to the part-
nership relationship than the law generally applicable to agency
relationships.
It follows from the above discussion that the effect of having no statu-
tory standard form may be the deterrence of otherwise efficient business
relationships if the costs of entering into a customized agreement out-
weigh the perceived benefits of the relationship without an agreement.
B. Devising An Appropriate Standard Form
Although a statutory standard form can reduce the costs of forming a
partnership, standard form provisions that provide rules that few parties
would voluntarily adopt impose costs on the partnership relationship.
Even if the parties can draft around the standard form, they often con-
sciously or inadvertently adopt an inappropriate standard form. The
partners frequently underestimate the benefits of a dissociation agree-
ment because of the optimistic attitude that prevails on formation of the
venture, when the partners must either trust each other or forego the
deal." Alternatively, particularly in light of the informality of partner-
ship formation, 12 the partners may operate the business without any con-
sideration of the standard form because they do not know they are a
partnership, perhaps because they elected not to incur the costs of ob-
taining proper legal advice.
If the partners adopt statutory dissociation provisions they would not
have agreed to in the absence of transaction costs, this may increase the
likelihood that the dissociating partner will engage in conduct that bene-
fits him but is costly to the other partners." Also, partners who learn
they are at risk of such conduct may limit their risk by reducing their
investments of time and capital to a lower level than would have been
optimal if the statute had addressed the costs of dissociation.
10. See infra discussion at notes 62-65.
11. See Hetherington and Dooley, supra note 6, at 37.
12. See U.P.A. §§ 6 and 7. U.P.A. §§ 47, 6 U.L.A. 22-24, 38-39.
13. The costs of dissociation are discussed infra § V.C.3.
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The parties may risk application of an inappropriate standard form
even if they do enter into a customized agreement. First, the courts in-
terpret customized agreements with a bias toward the standard form.
For example, the courts have frequently strained to interpret partnership
agreements so as to provide for payment of the fair market value of the
partner's interest in the partnership rather than the lesser amount explic-
itly adopted by the partners, 14 although the parties may have reduced the
payout as a way of internalizing expected high costs of discontinuity. 15
Second, a standard form that includes provisions most partners would
not agree to may "booby trap" the agreement by imposing consequences
the partners did not expect and therefore neglected to draft around. For
example, a partnership agreement that merely provides for "dissolution"
or "termination" in specified circumstances may surprise the partners by
failing to protect them from U.P.A. consequences in the event of the
occurrence of an unprovided for U.P.A. cause.
In light of the foregoing, design of standard form dissociation provi-
sions that most parties would select in the absence of transaction costs is
extremely important. The appropriate dissociation provisions are deter-
mined to some extent by other aspects of the U.P.A. standard form,
which I will assume as given for purposes of this Article. Each partner
exercises substantial control within the firm and can create partnership
liabilities vis a vis third parties. Partners are, in turn, personally liable
for the debts of the business.16 It follows from these features that the
14. See, ag., Skillman v. First Nat. Bank of Kansas City, 524 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)
("value of his interest in the capital account" to be paid in the event of partner disability refers to fair
market value rather than book value); Bass v. Dalton, 213 Neb. 360, 329 N.W.2d 115 (1983)(agree-
ment providing that retiring partner not entitled to compensation for interest in partnership property
interpreted as not referring to interest in profits, which is a debt of the partner rather than a partner-
ship asset under U.P.A. § 40); Schumann v. Samuels, 31 Wis. 2d 373, 142 N.W.2d 777 (1966)(where
"book value" is not defined it is interpreted to refer to market value). Some courts have even re-
ferred to a "judicial hostility" to agreements that limit payment to book rather than market value.
See Mahan v. Mahan, 107 Ariz. 517, 489 P.2d 1197 (1971); Anderson v. Wadena Silo Co., 310
Minn. 288, 246 N.W.2d 45 (1976); Bohn v. Bohn Implement Co., 325 N.W.2d 281 (N.D. 1982).
This is similar to the problem of bias in favor of official meanings discussed in Goetz and Scott, supra
note 7, at 290-9 1. There appears to be a trend toward acceptance of sub-market continuation agree-
ments. See G&S Investments v. Belman, 145 Ariz. 285, 700 P.2d 1358 (Ariz. App. 1984); Bohn v.
Johnson, 371 N.W.2d 781 (N.D. 1985).
15. See infra § VI.
16. Although the need for limited liability business associations has been forcefully demon-
strated (see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 370-71 (3d ed. 1986); Easterbrook and
Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 89 (1985)), the arguments in
favor of limited liability do not preclude the need for an alternative standard form providing for
1987]
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partners would want to limit a partner's ability to bring in powerful new
members by transferring their shares 17 and would therefore insist on
some other way of withdrawing their shares and escaping exposure to
personal liability.
The specific terms of the escape route that should be offered in the
partnership standard form depend not only on the characteristics of indi-
vidual liability and limited transferability that are inherent in partner-
ship, but also on the number of partners of the individual firm. For
example, the danger that a buyout or liquidation right will aid a squeeze
out by the dissociating partner may be greater in a firm with relatively
few partners than in a firm with many partners. This happens because of
the increased likelihood in the former situation that the dissociating part-
ner will be able to use the buyout or liquidation right to exploit a domi-
nant position in connection with the resulting auction of the business.,
This difference among firms means that standard form dissociation provi-
sions that are wholly appropriate for one partnership may be inappropri-
ate and inefficient for another.
Despite variation among firms, the relatively closely-held firm is a suit-
able model for designing statutory dissociation provisions because econo-
mies of scale of transaction costs make large firms more likely than
smaller ones to enter into customized agreements. Thus, throughout this
Article, where I must choose between designing the statute for a firm
with many members and a firm with few members, I will opt for the
small firm model.
III. ELEMENTS AND METHODS OF DISSOCIATION
A. Defining Dissociation
This Article addresses the question how should the partnership statute
deal with partner dissociation.19 Dissociation refers to the termination of
the partner's legal relationship with the firm. It should be distinguished
from "withdrawal," which connotes a voluntary act that may or may not
trigger the consequences of dissociation. I first discuss the legal elements
of dissociation from the firm-termination of obligations to co-partners
personal liability. Whether such a standard form is, in fact, desireable is beyond the scope of this
Article.
17. See infra text following note 21.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 88-94.
19. This is a more general topic than partnership dissolution, which, as I will discuss in
§ III(B), is only one of several ways to achieve partner dissociation.
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and to creditors and termination of the partner's investment in the firm.
I then identify some alternative methods of dissociating.
A partner's obligations to co-partners normally consist of duties to
contribute capital and services and fiduciary duties. The partners have a
fiduciary obligation under U.P.A. § 21 to account for unauthorized bene-
fits from transactions related to the partnership. The partners' contribu-
tion obligations arise under current law, if at all, from the partnership
agreement because the U.P.A. does not mandate such contributions.
Even without an explicit agreement, however, a court might imply an
obligation to contribute services from the parties' expectation that they
would all work in the business.
As long as the statute does not attach contribution obligations to part-
nership status, it need not provide for termination of these obligations.
Thus, the agreement may cut off further contribution obligations even of
one who remains a partner, and an ex-partner who refuses or fails to
make an agreed contribution will be held responsible for breach of con-
tract.20 On the other hand, since the statute attaches fiduciary obliga-
tions to partnership status, the statute must specify when these duties
terminate.
Termination of obligations to creditors has two components-respon-
sibility for liabilities as of the date of dissociation and liability for post-
dissociation obligations. Even if the continuing partners assume pre-dis-
sociation obligations, the dissociating partner's obligations can be dis-
charged only with the actual or implied consent of the creditors, who
initially extended credit in reliance on the personal liability of all of the
partners. Creditors normally will not consent unless they are paid or at
least offered additional consideration. Thus, an obligation to obtain the
dissociating partner's discharge from existing liabilities differs signifi-
cantly from one merely to assume these debts. Post-dissociation obliga-
tions should be binding on the dissociating partner only to the extent
necessary to accomodate the interests of relying creditors.
20. A partner's promise to perform services, like other personal service contracts, is rarely, if
ever, specifically enforceable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 359 and comments.
More often, the breach will give rise to an action for damages. See Hart v. Myers, 59 Hun 420, 13
N.Y.S. 388 (Sup. Ct. 1891), aff'd 128 N.Y. 578, 28 N.E. 250 (1891)(liability for the cost of a substi-
tute employee); Olivier v. Uleberg, 74 N.D. 453, 23 N.W. 2d 39, 165 A.L.R. 974 (1946) (liability for
the value of the promised but unperformed services); Annotation, Liability of Partner for Failure to
Perform Personal Services, 165 A.L.R. 981 (1946). Nonperformance of promised services could also
be a basis of judicial dissolution for misconduct or incapacity of the nonperforming partner. See
U.P.A. § 32(l)(b), (c) & (d), 6 U.L.A. at 394.
1987]
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Finally, termination of the partner's investment in the firm obviously
necessitates payment for the partner's share of the value of the firm by
the partnership, the partners or third parties through transfer, buyout or
liquidation.
B. Methods of Achieving Partner Dissociation
L In General
In order to understand the policy choices involved in statutory dissoci-
ation provisions, we must evaluate alternative methods by which the stat-
ute can effectuate these elements: transfer, liquidation, buyout and
dissolution. The choice of methods cuts across the elements of dissocia-
tion in the sense that choice of a single method may determine more than
one but not necessarily all elements. For example, the choice between
buyout and liquidation under the U.P.A. affects only the method of ter-
minating partners' capital contributions and pre-dissolution obligations
and not their obligations among themselves and to post-dissolution
creditors.
2. Transfer
The first alternative is "transfer." Transfer refers to sale of the part-
nership interest to a third party by means of a transaction wholly be-
tween the dissociating partner and the third party.21 A partner could
fully dissociate by transfer in the sense discussed in Section III (A) if
(1) the partner's status terminated upon transfer; (2) the third party was
willing to pay the full value of the partner's interest and assume partner-
ship liabilities; (3) the partnership creditors discharged the dissociating
partner from pre-dissociation debts; and (4) the transferor had no liabil-
ity for post-dissociation debts to creditors with notice of the transfer.
Partner dissociation by transfer of interests is not feasible for a number
of reasons, all attributable to some extent to the partners' personal liabil-
ity for partnership debts. First, the non-transferring partners would in-
sist on the right to screen transferees who acquired management rights,
particularly if these rights were accompanied by agency power to bind
the partnership. Although this does not prevent transfer of partnership
21. Auction of the partnership assets may result in acquisition of the firm by the non-dissociat-
ing partners and one or more third parties. Although the net result is similar to transfer, the transac-
tion is different because it involves action on the part of the firm or the partners as a group and not
merely the dissociating partner and the third party.
[Vol. 65:357
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss2/3
PARTNER DISSOCIATION
status without management rights, a transferee would pay little for the
right to assume risk without control.
Second, a third party would be unwilling, without being paid a sub-
stantial risk premium, to assume personal liability for pre-transfer part-
nership debts in light of the difficulty of obtaining adequate information
about these liabilities. Third, even if the transferee did assume the liabili-
ties, the transferor would not thereby be discharged. Discharging the
transferor would sharply increase the costs of extending credit to part-
nerships by creating uncertainty as to the nature of the risk undertaken.
Partnerships and creditors would therefore be forced to incur the costs of
contracting around the statute, thus reducing the value of the standard
form.
3. Buyout and Liquidation
A partner's inability to dissociate by means of a sale of his interest to a
third party necessitates a form of dissociation that utilizes the assets of
the partnership or of the other partners. Two methods for utilizing these
assets include "buyout" and "liquidation." 22 "Buyout" refers to the dis-
sociating partner's right to obtain the purchase of his or her interest by
the remaining partners or the partnership at a price determined by mu-
tual agreement or, failing agreement, by the court. "Liquidation" refers
to the dissociating partner's right to compel a sale of all of the partner-
ship assets at an auction. At the auction, the outcome of the bidding
determines the price.
The difference between the liquidation and buyout rights may be more
apparent than real. Liquidation, because it secures a cash payment for
all of the partnership's assets, can result in piecemeal sale and discharge
of the partnership's pre-dissoluton liabilities.23 On the other hand, liqui-
dation may involve sale of the partnership as a going concern. This type
of liquidation differs from buyout only in that the rules of the sale are
different. In a buyout, the non-dissociating partners have the legal right
to continue the business if they can purchase the interest of the other at
22. There are obviously many more ways to achieve one or more of the elements of dissociation
identified in § III(B). Some of these methods amount to a limited dissociation that is more properly
characterized as a distribution than termination of a partner's association with the firm. Beyond
this, I have simplified the discussion in order to draw out the relevant policy considerations, which
can then be applied to other possible permutations of the specific alternatives discussed here.
23. The question of whether liquidation should be accompanied by discharge is discussed infra
§ V(E).
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an agreed upon or judicially determined price. In liquidation, neither
partner group has a legal advantage and the continuing party is the one
who makes the highest bid for the business. The important issue in dis-
tinguishing liquidation and buyout is not, therefore, whether the business
continues, but who continues it.2
4
4. Dissolution
"Dissolution" as used in this article refers to the end of the partnership
entity. U.P.A. §§ 29 and 30 provide that the partnership continues after
dissolution until completion of winding up, at which point the partner-
ship terminates. For present purposes, what is important is not the dis-
tinction between dissolution and termination but that under the U.P.A.
any continuation of the business as a going concern after dissolution
technically is by a new entity. By contrast, transfers of stock do not
affect a corporate entity. Whether and to what extent dissolution is nec-
essary to accomplish partner dissociation is discussed below.2"
IV. PARTNER DISSOCIATION UNDER THE U.P.A.
A. Dissociation by Dissolution
This Part examines the U.P.A.'s approach to partner dissociation in
the light of the general definitions and considerations outlined in Part
III.
Partner dissociation cannot be effected under the U.P.A. without dis-
solution of the partnership, since dissolution triggers the elements of dis-
sociation, including termination of capital and credit contributions.
Dissolution results from, among other things,26 events that would be ex-
pected to be occasions for dissociation; voluntary withdrawal from par-
ticipation in the firm;27 the express will of a partner;28 expulsion of a
24. The distinction between buyout and liquidation is analogous to the distinction between a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy liquidation, in which the business may continue as a going concern with both
outsiders and existing owners bidding for the business, and a Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization,
in which the equity in the reorganized firm is sold to the creditors of the bankrupt business. See T.
JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITs OF BANKRUPTCY, 211 (1986).
25. See infra § V(F).
26. Causes of dissolution not involving withdrawal from participation in partnership affairs are
termination of the agreed term or undertaking (U.P.A. § 31(l)(a)); an event that makes it unlawful
to continue the business or to continue it as a partnership (U.P.A. § 31(4)); bankruptcy of the part-
ner or partnership; and decree of court (U.P.A. §§ 31(6) & 32). See U.P.A. § 31-32, 6 U.L.A. at
376-77, 394-95.
27. U.P.A. § 29 provides that "dissolution ... is the change in the relation of the partners
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partner in accordance with the partnership agreement;29 and partner
death.3a
B. Termination of Obligations to Co-Partners
Following dissolution, 1 the partnership winds up and terminates. At
that point, the partners have no further obligations to each other arising
solely out of partner status, particularly including fiduciary duties.32
C. Termination of Obligations as to Post-Dissociation Debts
Dissolution largely terminates the partners' credit contributions as to
post-dissolution transactions. U.P.A. § 35 provides that the partnership
is bound after dissolution only by (1) acts by non-bankrupt partners that
are appropriate for winding up; and (2) by other transactions with credi-
tors who had no knowledge or notice of the dissolution (unless the part-
nership was dissolved because its business was unlawful).
Dissolution terminates partners' mutual agency authority whether or
not the partnership business continues after dissolution. If the dissolved
caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as distinguished from the winding
up of the business." This inartfully drafted provision hopelessly entangles cause-a partner's "ceas-
ing to be associated"-and effect-a "change in the relation of the partners." The latter seems to
refer to U.P.A. § 30 which, like the end of U.P.A. § 29, provides that after dissolution the partner-
ship enters the winding up phase. The problem is that "ceasing to be associated" is tied in § 29 to
the entry into the winding up phase, which is the effect of dissolution. Thus, § 29 can be read as
providing that dissolution is caused by its effect. It obviously makes more sense to separate the
Section into its two components of (1) causation of dissolution by withdrawal of a partner, and
(2) the effect of entry into the winding up phase. Even this interpretation does not remove all diffi-
culty because there are causes of dissolution that do not involve partner withdrawal. See supra note
23. It is, in all events, clear under the case law that partner withdrawal causes dissolution. See
Berenter v. Staggers, 362 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Ramseyer v. Ramseyer, 98 Idaho 47, 558 P.2d
76 (1976); Cox v. Jones, 412 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1967); Stein v. Jung, 492 S.W.2d 139 (Mo. App.
1973); Schoeller v. Schoeller, 465 S.W.2d 648 (Mo. App. 1971); Cave v. Cave, 81 N.M. 797, 474
P.2d 480 (1970); Lonning v. Kurtz, 291 N.W.2d 438 (N.D. 1980); Williams v. Terbinskii, 23 Ohio
Misc. 53, 261 N.W.2d 920 (Ohio Com. Pleas, 1970); Timmermann v. Timmermann, 272 Or. 613,
538 P.2d 1254 (1975); Meuret v. Meuret, 48 Or. App. 701, 617 P.2d 918 (1980); Parker v. Donald,
477 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 482 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1972); Kelly v.
Kelly, 411 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); Ashley v. Lance, 80 Wash. 2d 274, 493 P.2d 1242,
(1972).
28. U.P.A. § 31(1)(b), 6 U.L.A. at 376 (express will where no definite term or undertaking);
U.P.A. § 31(2), 6 U.L.A. at 376 (express will in contravention of the partnership agreement).
29. U.P.A. § 31(l)(d), 6 U.L.A. at 376.
30. U.P.A. § 31(4), 6 U.L.A. at 376.
31. See supra § IV(A).
32. The partners' fiduciary duties continue through "liquidation" of the partnership. U.P.A.
§ 21(1), 6 U.L.A. at 258.
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partnership is actually going out of business, it makes sense that the part-
ners can no longer bind the partnership to transactions that are "for ap-
parently carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership."33
But if the business continues, dissolution should not have a drastic effect
on liability. In fact, it does not because the continuing partnership is
liable for any debts it incurs without regard to § 35. Therefore, the prin-
cipal effect of dissolution where the partnership business continues is
merely to cut off the liability and the power to bind of a withdrawn part-
ner or estate. Accomplishing this result by destroying the partnership
entity is like removing a door from a building by demolishing the build-
ing and then rebuilding it without the door. A partner's authority obvi-
ously can be terminated as effectively as under the U.P.A. without the
costs resulting from dissolution of the partnership entity. 34
D. Termination of Obligations as to Pre-Dissolution Debts
Dissolution itself discharges neither the existing liabilities of the part-
ners35 nor those of the dissolved partnership (at least until the partner-
ship terminates at the conclusion of winding up36). In the event of a
buyout, the continuing partners normally assume rather than obtain dis-
charge of the liabilities. Liabilities are usually discharged by payment on
liquidation of the partnership assets.37
Dissolution may have a more significant effect on the partnership's ex-
ecutory contracts. Although dissolution does not necessarily terminate
the partnership's executory agreements, 38 the contract may terminate by
its own terms on dissolution,39 even if the dissolution was only a techni-
cal one caused by a change in membership and the business was contin-
33. U.P.A. § 9(1), 6 U.L.A. at 132.
34. These costs are discussed infra § V(F)(2).
35. U.P.A. § 36(1), 6 U.L.A. at 436.
36. U.P.A. § 30, 6 U.L.A. at 367.
37. For further discussion of discharge on liquidation, see infra § V(E).
38. City of North Kansas City v. Sharp, 414 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1969); Centeno v. Roseville
Community Hospital, 107 Cal. App. 3d 62, 167 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1979); Rossetti v. City of New
Britain, 163 Conn. 283, 303 A.2d 714 (1972); Boroughs, Dale & Griffin v. St. Elias Eastern Ortho-
dox Church, 120 Ga. App. 434, 170 S.E.2d 865 (1969); Edco Properties v. Landry, 371 So.2d 1367
(La. App. 1979), writ denied, 375 So. 2d 945 (1979). As to liability for goods contracted for before
the dissolution and delivered to the continuing business after dissolution, see Herring v. Mishawaka
Rubber & Wollen Mg. Co., 192 Ark. 1055, 95 S.W.2d 1141 (1936) (incorporation of partnership);
Henry v. Seiberling Rubber Co., 265 Ky. 241, 96 S.W.2d 590 (1936); Goldman v. General Supply
Co., 6 So.2d 778 (La. App. 1942); Clinchfield Fuel Co. v. W.M. Lundy & Son, 130 Tenn. 135, 169
S.W. 563 (1914).
39. See Frederick C. Smith Clinic v. Lastrapes, 111 Ohio App. 42, 170 N.E.2d 497 (1959) (non-
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ued. Also, a contract might bind a particular entity and therefore
terminate on dissolution of the entity, again even if the dissolution was
only a technical one.' Finally, the third party might terminate a con-
tract on dissolution caused by departure of a person who was important
to performance of the contract.41
Dissolution may also affect the creditors' ability to obtain payment of
partnership liabilities. If the partnership business is terminated and the
assets are sold, U.P.A. § 40 entitles the pre-dissolution creditors to prior-
ity payment out of the proceeds of sale. Dissolution may, however, cause
problems for pre-dissolution creditors if the partnership is continued af-
ter dissolution. U.P.A. § 41 provides that in the absence of fraud the
successor firm assumes liabilities of the old firm only in certain situations:
when it agrees to do so or the firm is rightfully continued by one or more
of the partners in the dissolved partnership. Thus, the successor firm is
not generally liable if the partnership is continued without assumption or
consent by some of the former partners,42 or if the partnership is incorpo-
rated, so that the party carrying on the business is technically the corpo-
ration rather than one or more of the original partners.43 If the liabilities
of the old partnership do not carry over to the new one, the creditors
competition covenant of employee unenforceable after change in firm membership's contract pro-
vided for automatic termination on dissolution of firm).
40. See Fairway Development Co. v. Title Insurance Co. of Minn., 621 F. Supp. 120 (N.D.
Ohio 1985) (successor partnership not entitled to sue under policy guaranteeing title of original
partnership).
41. This is particularly true where the contract called for the professional services of the depart-
ing member. Rosner v. Modem Maid Packers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 685 (D. Conn. 1967) (withdrawal
of one of two members of food brokerage partnership terminated obligations of food process to
partnership); Little v. Caldwell, 101 Cal. 553, 36 P.107 (1894) (client may discharge law firm); Felt
v. Mitchell, 44 Ind. App. 96, 88 N.E. 723 (1909); Schlau v. Enzenbacher, 265 Ill. 626, 107 N.E. 107
(1914) (dissolution of real estate broker partnership terminated their power to sell client's land);
Wheaton v. Cadillac Automobile Co., 143 Mich. 21, 106 N.W. 399 (1906) (manufacturer may termi-
nate sales agency after dissolution of partnership of automobile sales agents); Egner v. States Realty
Co., 223 Minn. 305, 26 N.W.2d 464, (1947) (dissolution of real estate brokerage firm terminates
power to sell client's land); Clifton v. Clark, Hood & Co., 83 Miss. 446, 36 So. 251, (1904) (client
may discharge law firm); Puffer v. Merton, 168 Wis. 366, 170 N.W. 368, (1919). But see Rossetti v.
City of New Britain, 163 Conn. 283, 303 A.2d 714 (1972) (city could not terminate contract for
architectural services after withdrawal of partner where duties under the contract were not personal
to the withdrawing partner). Note that in these situations it is really the departure of the partner
and not the dissolution of the partnership that gives rise to the right to terminate.
42. Pursuant to U.P.A. § 38(1), 6 U.L.A. at 456, the innocent partner would have the right to
application of partnership property. See supra § IV(F)(2). However, the partnership business could
be continued without a sale of the partnership property if an innocent partner merely acquiesced in
continuation without either consenting to continuation or insisting on liquidation.
43 For further discussion of § 41 see infra text accompanying notes 149-50.
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cannot levy execution on its property to enforce the claim, but rather
must resort to the more limited charging order against the former part-
ners under U.P.A. § 28.'
Thus, although dissolution itself does not cut off pre-dissolution claims
and contracts, it sufficiently affects pre-dissolution dealings that both the
partnership and its creditors must engage in costly planning against the
eventuality of dissolution.
E. Termination of Capital Contribution
The dissociating partner terminates his or her capital contribution by
receiving the cash value of his or her interest either through liquidation
under U.P.A. § 38(1) or through buyout under U.P.A. §§ 38(2) and 42.
These alternatives will be discussed in the next Section.
F Alternative Methods of Achieving Dissociation under the U.P.A.:
Transfer, Buyout and Liquidation
L Transfer
This Section discusses the extent to which the U.P.A. adopts the vari-
ous dissociation methods discussed in Section III(B).
Consistently with the considerations outlined in Section III(B)(l), the
U.P.A. does not allow full transferability of partnership interests.
U.P.A. § 24 clearly distinguishes a partner's "interest in the partnership"
from "his right to participate in the management." A partner's interest
in the partnership includes only his financial rights (U.P.A. § 26) and is
freely transferable (U.P.A. § 27(1)). U.P.A. § 18(g) provides that, sub-
ject to contrary agreement, "[n]o person can become a member of a part-
nership without the consent of all the partners." Because a partner's
interest in the partnership includes only "profits and surplus," an as-
signee does not assume debts of the firm. Even one who is admitted as a
full-fledged partner does not automatically assume personal liability for
pre-admission liabilities of the firm."
44. See U.P.A. § 25(2)(c), 6 U.L.A. at 326.
45. See U.P.A. § 17, 6 U.L.A. at 207 (the incoming partner assumes such obligations, but "this
liability shall be satisfied only out of partnership property"); U.P.A. § 41(7), 6 U.L.A. at 510 (liabil-
ity of third person becoming partner after dissolution "shall be satisfied out of partnership property
only").
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2. Liquidation
As discussed in Section IV(A), dissolution is basic to dissociation
under the U.P.A. In the vast majority of circumstances, dissolution trig-
gers a right by any partner pursuant to U.P.A. § 38(1) to compel liquida-
tion of the firm-specifically, to "have the partnership property applied
to discharge its liabilities, and the surplus applied to pay in cash the net
amount owing to the respective partners." This right exists unless (1) the
partners have agreed to vary the rights under § 38(1); (2) dissolution is
caused in contravention of the partnership agreement, as by express will
of a partner prior to the expiration of an agreed term or undertaking;46 or
(3) dissolution is caused by expulsion of a partner. Even if the dissolu-
tion is "in contravention," any innocent partner has a liquidation right
pursuant to U.P.A. § 38(2)(a).
A partner's right to application of assets involves a right to insist on a
judicial sale of the partnership assets as distinguished from a one-on-one
buyout4 7 or distribution of the assets in kind.48 This may mean that the
business is sold as a going concern at the liquidation sale. The purchas-
ers on a going concern basis are typically some of the partners in the
46. This exception to the liquidation right has been held to apply to dissolution by judicial
decree based on partner misconduct rather than by express will (see U.P.A. § 32(l)(c)-(d), 6 U.L.A.
at 394). Zieback v. Nasser, 12 Cal. 2d 1, 82 P.2d 375 (1938); Ohlendorfv. Feinstein, 636 S.W.2d 687
(Mo. App. 1982); Dow v. Beals, 149 Misc. 631, 268 N.Y.S. 425 (1933); Drashner v. Sorenson, 75
S.D. 247, 63 N.W.2d 255 (1954). See Hillman, Misconduct as a Basis for Excluding or Expelling a
Partner: Effecting Commercial Divorce and Securing Custody of the Business, 78 Nw.U.L. REV. 527,
537-38, 551-52 (1983). This point is clarified in GA. CODE ANN. § 14-8-38 (1986), which refers to
dissolution "wrongfully either in contravention of the partnership agreement or as a result of the
wrongful conduct of a partner." See Ribstein, An Analysis of Georgia's New Partnership Law, 36
MERCER L. REV. 443, 503-04 (1985). One court has held that dissolution was wrongful even if the
partnership was at will, so that the "wrongful" partner could have rightfully dissolved the partner-
ship by express will. Monteleone v. Monteleone, 147 Ill. App. 3d 265, 100 Ill. Dec. 859, 497 N.E.2d
1221 (1986).
47. See Mahan v. Mahan, 107 Ariz. 517, 489 P.2d 1197 (1971) (relying in part on an Arizona
decedent's statute); Davis v. Davis, 149 Colo. 1, 366 P.2d 857 (1961); Polikoffv. Levy, 132 Ill. App.
2d 492, 270 N.E.2d 540 (1971); Detroit Bank & Trust v. Dickson, 78 Mich. App. 12, 259 N.W.2d
228 (1977); Gorger v. Gorger, 276 Or. 267, 555 P.2d 1 (1976) (remand for determination of partners'
rights under statute, but strongly indicating that there was a right to liquidation); Young v. Cooper,
203 S.W.2d 376 (Tenn. App. 1947).
48. See Batch v. Brown, 289 Ala. 699, 271 So.2d 833 (1973), 331 So.2d 671 (Ala. 1976) (opin-
ion after remand); Heard v. Carter, 159 Ga. App. 801, 285 S.E.2d 246 (1981) (applying partnership
agreement, which required expelling partners to "liquidate" the business); Taylor v. Bryan, 664
S.W.2d 52 (Mo. App. 1984); Nupetco Assocs. v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877 (Utah 1983) (court indicated
that if property could not be sold in depressed market trial court could consider alternative of parti-
tion); Dreifuerst v. Dreifuerst, 90 Wis. 2d 566, 280 N.W.2d 335 (1979).
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dissolved partnership, either alone or with third parties. The courts have
sustained fairly conducted sales to the partners. 9
The liquidation right means that a partner can terminate his invest-
ment by receiving a "market" valuation at the judicial sale. A partner
fully terminates his or her contribution of credit insofar as pre-dissocia-
tion creditors are concerned by reason of the duty under § 38(1) to apply
partnership assets to discharge liabilities.5"
The courts have qualified the statutory right to application of partner-
ship assets to some extent where recognition of the liquidation right
would inflict particularly heavy costs on the other partners. They have
held that a partner may be able to buy out a co-partner and continue the
business if dissolution was caused by death of a partner" t and so was
likely to have been unanticipated, forced sale of assets would result in a
loss of value because of the nature of the asset,5 2 or because of current
market conditions,53 or if other circumstances justify a buyout right.5 4
Also, partners must exercise the power to dissolve consistently with their
fiduciary duties;55 and they may be liable for appropriating partnership
49. See Prentiss v. Sheffel, 20 Ariz. App. 411, 513 P.2d 949 (1973); Mandell v. Centrum Fron-
tier Corp. 86 Ill. App. 3d 437, 41 11. Dec. 323, 407 N.E.2d 821, (1980); Cude v. Couch, 588 S.W.2d
554 (Tenn. 1979) (partner bid through secret agent).
50. The partners may, however, have to contribute personal funds to the payment of liabilities
under U.P.A. § 40 if other partnership assets are insufficient.
51. Chapman v. Dunnegan, 665 S.W.2d 643 (Mo. App. 1984); Balaban v. Bank of Nevada, 86
Nev. 862, 477 P.2d 860 (1970); Fortungno v. Hudson Manure Co., 51 N.J. Super. 482, 144 A.2d 207
(1958); Georgen v. Nebrich, 12 Misc. 2d 1011, 174 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1958). This is consistent with the
fact that the U.P.A. § 38(1) liquidation right is available only to "each partner" and not explicitly to
legal representatives of deceased partners or assigness. However, some U.P.A. provisions cut the
other way. See U.P.A. § 38, 6 U.L.A. at 456-7 (right to continue only in the event of wrongful
dissolution, expulsion or agreement); § 41(3), 6 U.L.A. at 510 (consent of legal representative implic-
itly required for continuation); § 37, 6 U.L.A. at 444 (deceased's representative may obtain winding
up by the court).
52. Gregg v. Bernardi, 250 Or. 458, 443 P.2d 166 (1968) (race horse).
53. Dow v. Beals, 149 Misc. 631, 268 N.Y.S. 425 (1933). See also Nupetco Assoes. v. Jenkins,
669 P.2d 877 (Utah 1983) (sale ordered, but court said trial court also had discretion to order parti-
tion in light of depressed economy).
54. See, e.g., Nicholes v. Hunt, 273 Or. 255, 541 P.2d 820 (1975). In Nicholes, the court per-
mitted a buyout rather than compelling liquidation where the business involved a technical process
that required the owners to have specific expertise. The process had been developed by the purchas-
ing partners who had invited the other partner into the business, and the selling partner had brought
on the break-up of the relationship partly through his own misconduct.
55. Howell v. Harvey, 5 Ark. 270, 39 Am Dec. 376 (1843); Belier v. Murphy, 139 Mo. App.
663, 123 S.W. 1029 (1910); Trigg v. Shelton, 249 S.W. 209 (Tex. Com. App. 1923); McMahon v.
McClernan, 10 W.Va. 410 (1877). See U.P.A. § 21(l), 6 U.L.A. at 258, which explicitly applies to
transactions connected with the "liquidation" of the partnership.
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property, including goodwill and partnership opportunities.56
3. Buyout
When the partnership business is continued, U.P.A. § 38(2), in the
event of wrongful dissolution, or § 42 determines the rights of the outgo-
ing partner or estate. Section 42 provides that the ongoing partner or
estate is entitled to "the value of his interest" and interest on this amount
or, at the outgoing partner's election, "the profits attributable to the use
of his right in the property of the dissolved partnership."
As discussed above,57 because the right to application of assets can
lead to auction of the partnership business as a going concern, the differ-
ence between the liquidation and buyout rights is not necessarily one be-
tween continuation and termination of the partnership business, but a
more subtle one that rests on the rights of the partners in each situation.
The partners are entitled on liquidation to be paid in cash and to be
discharged from partnership liabilities, so that the winning bidder is the
partner or partners who can muster sufficient resources to cover the full
net cash value of the partnership. If the dissociating partner is entitled
only to be bought out, however, the nondissociating partners have the
advantage in any contest for control of the firm because they have "first
option" to buy at a price that is either agreed on or fixed by the court.
The terms of the option, and therefore the extent of the non-dissociating
partners' advantage, depend on whether the dissociating partner wrong-
fully dissolved, was expelled or withdrew voluntarily and rightfully.
In a buyout governed by U.P.A. § 38(2)(b), the wrongful partner is
entitled only to the "value of his interest" less the goodwill component of
this value, and to termination of his credit contribution as to pre-dissolu-
tion liabilities to the extent of assumption of the liabilities by the continu-
56. Leff v. Gunter, 33 Cal. 3d 508, 189 Cal. Rptr. 377, 658 P.2d 740 (1983) (partner may not
begin work on bid for lease while associated with partnership and then withdraw and make compet-
ing bid); Page v. Page, 55 Cal. 2d 192, 10 Cal. Rptr. 643, 359 P.2d 41 (1961) (dictum: partner may
not appropriate business after dissolution without adequate compensation to copartner); Rosenfeld,
Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, 146 Cal. App. 3d 200, 194 Cal. Rptr. 180 (1983) (law partners may not
appropriate major antitrust case simply by withdrawing from firm); Lavin v. Ehrlich, 80 Misc. 2d
247, 363 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1974) (partner may not dissolve, buy building in which partnership operated
and refuse to negotiate lease with former partners); Howell v. Bowden, 368 S.W. 2d 842 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1963) (pre-U.P.A. damages for wrongful appropriation of partnership business by one partner
in partnership at will); Trigg v. Shelton, 249 S.W. 209 (Tex. Com. App. 1923); Featherstonhaugh v.
Fenwick, 17 Ves. 298, 34 Eng. Rep. 115 (1810). See also J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW
OF PARTNERSHIP 392 (1841).
57. See text accompanying note 24.
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ing partners 58 rather than to discharge. Moreover, the price is not
immediately payable in cash but rather need only be secured by court-
approved bond, at least until the expiration of the term of the partner-
ship.59 Therefore, rather than throwing the business up for grabs in a
bidding war between partners which will be won by the strongest part-
ner, the U.P.A. loads the scales in the wrongful dissolution situation on
the side of the innocent partners who wish to continue the business.
An expelled partner is treated somewhat more favorably than a wrong-
ful partner because expulsion does not have to be based on wrongful con-
duct.6" Thus, the expelled partner is entitled to immediate payment in
cash and to discharge from partnership liabilities. But there is no auction
and the expelled partner receives only "the net amount due him"-i.e.,
the value of his or her interest pursuant to U.P.A. § 42.
If the partnership is continued with the consent of the innocent part-
ners or estate, U.P.A. § 42 entitles these partners only to the value of
their interests. Although § 42 does not explicitly entitle them to any pro-
tection from partnership liabilities, the innocent partners can exact a
high price and adequate protection from partnership liabilities as a con-
dition of giving their consent to continuation. The right to application of
property therefore serves as the backdrop against which the terms of con-
tinuation are fixed.
G. Summary
In general, the U.P.A. approaches partner dissociation by blowing
58. U.P.A. § 38(2)(b), 6 U.L.A. at 456 provides that continuing partners must "indemnify" a
wrongfully dissolving partner, while § 38(2)(c) provides, somewhat inconsistently, that the wrongful
partner must be "released." For a discussion of the rights of wrongfully dissolving partners with
regard to protection from liabilities, see Hillman, supra note 46, at 555-7. U.P.A. § 36 governs
discharge of the former partner where the liabilities have been assumed, Section 36 provides for
discharge only upon express or implied agreement of the creditor or upon material alteration of the
debt with consent of a knowing creditor.
59. This is explicitly provided for in the Georgia version of U.P.A. § 38(2). The Georgia Code
omits the "agreed term" limitation while at the same time requiring that the wrongful partner be
paid, rather than permitting the mere securing of payment. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-8-38(b). The
parties could, of course, agree to limit the term of the continuation in exchange for delaying payment
for the interest after dissolution. If there is no such agreement, the partnership would dissolve at the
end of the agreed term, subject to the ability of the nonwrongful partners to continue the partnership
thereafter pursuant to U.P.A. § 23.
60. Under the U.P.A. § 31(l)(d), 6 U.L.A. at 376, expulsion need only be "bona fide in accord-
ance with such power conferred by the agreement between the partners." The grounds of expulsion
are discussed in Comment, The Expulsion Clause in a Partnership Contract: A Pre-Planned Dissolu-
tion, 13 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 868 (1980).
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apart the partnership through mandatory dissolution and by giving each
partner a right in most instances to compel liquidation, reserving the
more limited buyout right to a few specific situations. Mandatory disso-
lution is costly because it may disrupt relationships with and rights of
those who are dealing with the firm at the time of dissolution. The liqui-
dation right also may impose costs, as has been recognized by courts that
have qualified the liquidation right where the costs are particularly high.
The question raised by the above discussion is whether the costs associ-
ated with the U.P.A. "dynamite" approach are optimal in light of the
benefits of this approach in effecting partner dissociation. The next Sec-
tion addresses this question.
V. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE METHODS
OF ACHIEVING DISSOCIATION
A. In General
This Part evaluates the buyout, liquidation and dissolution methods of
partner dissociation.61 I will begin with the considerations relevant to
whether a partner should have at least a right to buyout. I will use this
as a "baseline" method of dissociation to be compared with a statutory
standard form that does not permit partner dissociation. I will then con-
sider under what circumstances a partner should be entitled to the more
drastic liquidation right, and under what circumstances the partnership
should be dissolved.
The discussion in this Section will assume that the partners have made
no agreement concerning dissociation. In Part VI, I will consider the
extent to which it should matter if dissociation occurs prior to the end of
an agreed term or undertaking. In Part VII, I will discuss the enforce-
ability of agreements specifically governing dissociation.
B. Buyout: Traditional Bases of the Buyout Right
The partners' right to obtain at least buyout of their interests at any
time has been said to rest on the view that partnership is a mutual agency
that can exist only as long as the partners consent, 62 and that partnership
61. As was discussed in § III(B)(2), the transfer method is not feasible in light of partners'
personal liability for the debts of the business. Accordingly, this method of dissociation will not be
discussed further.
62. Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U.S. 328 (1897); Lapenta v. Lettieri, 72 Conn. 377, 44 A. 730
(1890); Solomon v. Kirkwood, 55 Mich. 256, 21 N.W. 336 (1884); Napoli v. Dominitch, 226
N.Y.S.2d 908 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962); Cahill v. Haff, 248 N.Y. 377, 162 N.E. 288 (1928); Lonning v.
1987]
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is a kind of personal service contract and therefore not specifically
enforceable.63
As to the agency law ground of dissociation at will, it has been pointed
out that partnership could just as easily have been treated as a "power
given as a security" because the partners holding the power have a pro-
prietary interest in the subject matter of the agency.65 Thus, the absolute
right of dissociation from the partnership is not compelled by agency
law.
From the standpoint of whether partnership ought to be treated like a
revocable-at-will agency rather than an irrevocable power given as a se-
curity, a partner arguably should be able at any time to terminate the
heavy risks involved in being subject to another person's power to bind.
But while escape from continued exposure to risk is a benefit of the disso-
ciation right, exercise of that right may impose costs on the other owners.
The question is whether, in light of both the benefits and costs of the
withdrawal right, the parties would be sufficiently likely to agree to disso-
ciation that the right should be incorporated in the standard form.
The simple response to the specific enforcement basis of dissociation at
will is that merely precluding dissociation does not itself compel any fur-
ther acts by the partner-promissor who wishes to dissociate. The super-
vision problems involved in specific enforcement are raised only if the
court mandates performance of services the partner was contractually
obligated to perform.
Infusaid Corp. v. Intermedics Infusaid, Inc. 66 illustrates the distinction
between specifically enforcing personal services and prohibiting with-
Kurtz, 291 N.W.2d 438 (N.D. 1980); McCollum v. McCollum, 67 S.W.2d 1055 (Tex. Civ. App.
1934) (injunctive relief against dissolution refused); Logan v. Logan, 36 Wash. App. 411, 675 P.2d
1242 (1984); Crossman v. Gibney, 164 Wis. 395, 160 N.W. 172 (1916). See Lewis, The Uniform
Partnership Act, 24 YALE L.J. 617, 628 (1915). As to the revocability of agency, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 118 (1957).
63. Engebrecht v. McCollough, 80 Ariz. 77, 292 P.2d 845 (1956); see also Jebeles v. Costellos,
391 So.2d 1024, appeal after remand, 406 So.2d 393 (Ala. 1980) (trial court erred in ordering an
accounting and that defendant was to continue as sole active partner without ordering dissolution of
partnership, thereby imposing a new agreement on the parties); Wolf v. Baltimore, 250 Pa. Super.
230, 378 A.2d 911 (1977) (refusal to enjoin dissolution of partnership because damages are an ade-
quate remedy). But see Infusaid Corp. v. Intermedics Infusaid, Inc., 739 F.2d 661 (1st Cir. 1984),
discussed infra notes 63-66. As to personal service contracts, see Sarokhan v. Fair Lawn Memorial
Hosp., Inc., 83 N.J. Super. 127, 199 A.2d 52 (1964). For a statement of this dual basis of the power
to dissolve, see Hillman, Indissoluble Partnerships, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 691, 699 (1985).
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 139 (1957).
65. See Hillman, supra note 63, at 703-07.
66. 739 F.2d 661 (1st Cir. 1984).
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drawal. The court held, contrary to the U.P.A., that a joint venturer
could not withdraw if the venture "can be maintained as an ongoing,
profitmaking concern without obliging any officer or director of the cor-
poration that per se dissolved the relationship 'to continue in such a part-
nership against his will.' ",67 The court said that a finding that the joint
venture was an "ongoing, assembly line process" would "bode well for
the appropriateness of an equitable remedy."68 The court concluded that
if the appropriate findings were made, the venturers could be compelled
"to continue the business together according to the terms of the joint ven-
ture agreement."69 The personal service element therefore related not to
whether the joint venturer could dissociate from the venture, but to
whether it must continue performing the agreement.
Enforcing continuation of the partnership relationship does raise a
problem that is similar to specific enforcement: The partner who wishes
to dissociate is compelled to continue at least monitoring partnership af-
fairs because of his or her continued investment and personal liability for
partnership debts. While this involves a continuation of personal serv-
ices, it is not like specific enforcement of a personal service agreement
because it is the partner, and not the court, who determines how much
monitoring to do. The problem is the same as that which underlies the
analogy to revocable agency-the compelled continuation of risk-taking.
The traditional bases of the power to dissociate at will are unsatisfac-
tory: Neither the specific performance nor agency analogies compel a
buyout right. The buyout right may be justified only by weighing both
the costs and benefits associated with buyout.
C. Evaluation of Buyout Right
1. In General
This Section considers whether the statutory standard form should
give a partner at least the limited dissociation right involved in buyout.
This Section assumes for purposes of discussion that there is no agree-
ment that might be inconsistent with such a right. The specific question
is whether the partners would be likely in the absence of transaction costs
67. Id. at 669, quoting 3 KENT'S COMMENTARIES 56.
68. Id.
69. Id. (emphasis in original). The emphasis was added because the court noted that the dis-
trict court may have gone beyond the terms of the agreement. The court went on to hold that the
venture had been wrongfully dissolved, so that the nonwrongful partner had a right to carry on the
venture alone if it chose to do so. For further discussion of Infusaid, see supra note 94.
1987]
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to agree to at least a buyout right. The answer to that question depends
on a comparison of the benefits to the partners of having that buyout
right and the costs that the exercise of that right might inflict on the non-
dissociating partners.70
2. Benefits of Buyout Right
a. Control of Agency and Coordination Costs
The buyout right serves as a counter to the exploitive conduct of co-
partners. Some exploitive conduct results from the delegation of power
to managers in order to utilize the managers' skills. Managers may exer-
cise their discretion so as to benefit themselves at the expense of the busi-
ness by consuming excess personal time and therefore making decisions
carelessly, or by deliberately engaging in transactions on behalf of the
firm for personal benefit. This is the problem of agency costs-i.e., the
costs of delegating authority to agents.7 Another form of exploitation
involves "coordination costs"-the costs of exploitation by owners and of
devices to control such exploitation.7" These costs are distinguishable
from agency costs in that they arise from the allocation of control among
the owners--either to the majority, or to the minority in the form of a
veto--rather than from the need to utilize the skills of professional
managers.
The risk of exploitation may seem to be less in partnerships than in
corporations because partners have greater input into business decisions
than do corporate shareholders. In a partnership, each partner has an
equal vote on partnership matters73 and can veto important decisions.74
Thus, while corporate directors typically determine such matters involv-
ing a risk of exploitation as manager compensation and dividends, in the
70. It has been suggested that analysis of the availability of a withdrawal right involves "three
potentially conflicting objetives"-"stability," "liquidity" and "risk-aversion." Hillman, supra note
63, at 696. "Liquidity" appears to be one way of averting further exposure to the risks of the enter-
prise, and "stability" appears to comprise the costs of achieving liquidity. The cost-benefit analysis
employed in this article therefore is arguably an articulation of these objectives.
71. See generally Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure,
25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 738 (1978); Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
72. See Carney, The Theory of the Firm: Investor Coordination Costs, Control Premtiums and
Capital Structure, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. I (1987).
73. U.P.A. § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. at 213.
74. U.P.A. § 18(h), 6 U.L.A. at 213-14. For a discussion distinguishing majority exploitation
in partnerships and in corporations from the standpoint of partners' participation in control, see
Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 6, at 42-43.
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partnership these decisions would normally be made by unanimous vote
of the partners.75  But to the extent that this control structure shifts
power from managers to owners, it only shifts exploitation from agency
problems to coordination problems. The shifting of power from the ma-
jority to the minority through a veto power only changes the identity of
the potentially exploited group rather than the total amount of coordina-
tion costs. Moreover, the partners can vary the U.P.A. standard form by
agreement: Partnership agreements often provide for management au-
thority to be exercised by one or more managing partners, 76 and for im-
portant decisions to be made by a majority vote.7 7  Although there is
some authority that "fundamental" changes in the partnership cannot be
made by majority vote,78 any such limitations on explicit delegations of
power are questionable and unpredictable. Thus, in some partnerships
the nature of exploitation may be closely similar to that in corporations.
Fiduciary duties protect partners, like shareholders, from exploita-
75. U.P.A. § 18(a) provides for equal profit sharing among the partners, and U.P.A. § 18(f)
prohibits compensation of partners for acting in the partnership business. Both sections are subject
to contrary provision in the partnership agreement, but making and altering the agreement would be
by unanimous vote under U.P.A. § 18(h). See U.P.A. §§ 18(a),(f),(h), 6 U.L.A. at 213-14.
76. See Day v. Avery, 548 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied., 431 U.S. 908 (1977) (law
firm executive committee controlled Washington office under partnership agreement); Detrio v. Boy-
lan, 169 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1948) (power to fix salaries); Bernstein, Bernstein, Wile & Gordon v. Ross,
22 Mich. App. 117, 177 N.W. 2d 193 (1970) (exclusive management in senior partners); McAlpine v.
Millen, 104 Minn. 289, 116 N.W. 583 (1908); McCallum v. Asbury, 238 Ore. 257, 393 P.2d 774
(1964) (executive committee of medical partnership given general management authority subject to
other partners' power to alter or cancel action taken by majority vote); Trigg v. Shelton, 249 S.W.
209 (Tex. Com. App. 1923). Cf Michele Amoruco & Figli v. Fisheries Development Corp., 499 F.
Supp. 1074 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (partnership managed by American partner not unenforceable on the-
ory that American company controlled by foreign partner in violation of statute); Frank v. R.A.
Pickens & Son Co., 264 Ark. 307, 572 S.W.2d 133 (1978) (managing power could terminate plain-
tiff's interest in partnership); Texas Unemployment Comm'n. v. Bass, 137 Tex. 1, 151 S.W. 2d 567
(1947) (because partnerships with some common members were controlled by different partners
there was no business under common control that employed more than minimum number of em-
ployees for purposes of unemployment compensation contributions).
77. For a case upholding a partnership merger over a partner's objection pursuant to a major-
ity-vote provision in the partnership agreement, see Day v. Sidley & Austin, 394 F. Supp. 986
(D.D.C. 1975), aff'd sub noma, Day v. Avery, 548 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
908 (1977).
78. See McCallum v. Asbury, 238 Ore. 257, 393 P.2d 774 (1964) (upholding amendment creat-
ing management committee only because power of committee limited). For commentary advocating
this approach, see Comment, U. P.A. Section 18(h): Majority Control, Dissenting Partners and the
Need for Reform, 13 U.CAL. DAV. L. REV. 902 (1980). Professor Hillman has also argued that
managers have a duty to consult non-managing partners. Hillman, Power Shared and Power Denied:
A Look at Participatory Rights in the Management of General Partnerships, 1984 U.ILL. L. REV. 865,
884-86.
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tion.79 But this remedy is not wholly effective because it involves difficult
questions concerning the extent of the majority or managing partners'
duty and the damages resulting from breach of the duty, therefore neces-
sitating lengthy and costly litigation.80
In a publicly held firm, the efficient stock market provides an effective
antidote to agency and coordination cost problems in addition to that
provided by fiduciary duties. Since owners can transfer out of the com-
pany at little cost, shareholders can effectively contain damage from ex-
ploitation of their interests (provided they know of it).81 The efficient
market also gives management an incentive to refrain from exploitation
because it is relatively easy for someone who can offer superior manage-
ment to buy control at a premium over market and replace the
incumbents.8 2
Partnership interests, unlike corporate stock, are not normally freely
transferable.83 Giving each partner a right to sell his interest back to the
firm, depending on how the buyout price is determined and the transac-
tion costs of exercising the put, serves as a substitute for the efficient
market for corporate stock in containing exploitation.84 In fact, a buyout
price that represents the partner's pro rata share of the partnership is a
better counter to exploitation than an efficient market price because the
79. U.P.A. § 21 provides that every partner must account to the partnership for unauthorized
benefits. U.P.A. § 21, 6 U.L.A. at 258. Pursuant to U.P.A. § 22(c), this right may be enforced in an
accounting action. The classic statement of partners' fiduciary duties is that of Judge Cardozo in
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928): "not honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is ... the standard of behavior."
80. The principal method of enforcement of fiduciary duties apart from dissolution (the availa-
bility of which is at issue here) is by an action for accounting under U.P.A. § 22(a). A formal
accounting would involve a complete review of partnership affairs since the last accounting. Note
that a partner does have an advantage over corporate shareholders in respect of remedies: since an
accounting imposes substantial burdens on those who are responsible for partnership accounts-i.e.,
the managers-it can therefore be used by the wronged partner as a lever to force concessions.
81. However, the power to transfer shaares does not reduce the cost of exploitation that has
already occurred. See Carney, supra note 72, at 19. Compare the effect of a buyout right in control-
ling coordination costs, see infra note 85 and accompanying text.
82. See Easterbrook and Fischel, The Proper Role of A Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1982).
83. See supra §§ III(B)(2) & IV(F)(1).
84. Many writers have recognized this point. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 72, at 65; Epstein, In
Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHL L. REv. 947, 959 (1984); Goetz & Scott, Principles of
Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1144 (1981); Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 6 at 39-
41; Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521,
1546 (1982). See also Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975)
(right of buyout necessary in light of illiquidity of close corporation interests).
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pro rata price prevents the controlling faction from taking advantage of
its own exploitive conduct by purchasing the minority's interest at a dis-
count.85 Moreover, like the efficient stock market, the buyout right can
deter exploitation because it can act as a mechanism for replacement of
dishonest or lazy managers of the partnership by dissociating partners
who are able to purchase the assets of the business.
b. Other Benefits
Apart from the risk of misconduct by copartners, a wholly illiquid in-
vestment may be forced to earn returns that are lower than those that
could be earned in a different business as a result of a change in circum-
stances from the time of the partner's initial investment in the firm.86 If
the change in circumstances adversely affects the business as a whole
rather than an individual partner, presumably the partners would agree
to terminate the business. An individual partner's right to be bought out
is particularly important where a change in circumstances affects his or
her human capital, as where the partner gains additional knowledge or
expertise that is best used in a more specialized firm.87
Even a partner whose services are most efficiently utilized within the
firm may, because of a change in circumstances since the partner joined
the firm, seek to leave because his or her contributions are being compen-
sated at below-market rates. For example, the compensation of a law
partner may not adequately reflect the increase of the partner's profes-
sional or business-getting skills since the partner's profit share was fixed.
85. It is not clear that the U.P.A. mandates a pro rata share. In Seattle-First National Bank v.
Marshall, 31 Wash. App. 339, 641 P.2d 1194 (1982) the court held that a deceased partner's share
was to be determined without a minority discount where the partnership agreement specifically pro-
vided that the value of the interest was "deemed to be the value determined by multiplying the net
worth of the partnership by the interest of the deceased or selling partner," stating that a discount
might be appropriate if the partnership agreement had not specifically provided for pro rata treat-
ment. U.P.A. § 42, which governs the payment to a partner on continuation after non-wrongful
dissolution, provides for payment to the existing partner of the "value of his interest." Nevertheless,
in light of each partner's substantial participation in management under U.P.A. § 18(e) and (h), a
strong argument can be made that the "default" valuation under the U.P.A. should be pro rata.
86. See W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, supra note 6, at 56 (right to sell interest reduces risk of loss);
Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 6, at 44.
87. Although service obligations are not specifically enforceable (see supra note 20), the part-
ners' human capital is committed to the firm in the affirmative sense that the partner must continue
to monitor the firm's business as long as his or her capital and credit are tied up in the firm, and in
the negative sense that a partner is not permitted in the absence of contrary agreement to earn gains
related to the firm without sharing these gains with the other partners. See U.P.A. § 21, 6 U.L.A. at
258.
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3. The Costs of the Buyout Right
a. The Risk of Takeover
Are the benefits of a buyout right outweighed by the costs of such a
right? In other words, would a partner have more to fear from giving his
or her co-partners a buyout right than he or she would stand to gain
from having such a right?
One problem with the buyout right is that it may permit a takeover of
the firm by the "dissociating" partner.8" This can occur in a number of
circumstances where the non-dissociating partners cannot practicably re-
place the resources removed from the firm by the dissociating partner,
and so are unable to buy out the dissociating partner and continue the
firm. Specifically, the remaining partners may be unable to pay for the
dissociating partner's interest without selling the firm's assets, to replace
unique assets that were owned by the partner, to restore the creditworthi-
ness attributable to the personal wealth of the dissociating partner, or to
replace the dissociating partner's managerial skills.8 9 A single partner's
contributions are most likely irreplaceable in a firm with relatively few
owners, the model for the statutory standard form.90
Page v. Page9 illustrates this situation. In Page, the court permitted
dissolution as of right by a managing partner who held a substantial de-
mand note of the partnership, a linen supply firm, with the probable re-
sult that his brother and co-partner would be forced out of the business
and unable to share in the burgeoning business from a new military base.
In another case, a dissolving partner could appropriate the partnership's
laundromat because he owned the premises in which the business was
operated and he refused to lease them to his partner or any other
successor.
92
Although the takeovers discussed in the preceding paragraph resulted
from exercise of the U.P.A. liquidation right, a takeover clearly can oc-
88. "Dissociating" is used here in the technical sense of a partner who exercises a right to
dissociate from the firm although the result may be the exclusion of the "non-dissociating" partners
from the business.
89. A survey of close corporation dissolution cases revealed that dissolution was "rarely used as
a takeover tactic" by the plaintiff. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 6, at 36. However, the
surveyed cases arose under statutes that required a showing of oppression or other misconduct for
dissolution, and so invited suits mainly by frozen-out holders whose need to take legal action was
probably attributable to the fact that they did not hold significant resources.
90. See supra § II(B).
91. 55 Cal. 2d 192, 359 P.2d 41, 10 Cal. Rptr. 643 (1961).
92. Cude v. Couch, 588 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. 1977).
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cur on buyout even if the dissociating partner does not have a liquidation
right. In Pav-Saver Corp. v. Vasso Corp., the terminating partner
owned the patents of the machines manufactured by the partnership.
The partnership agreement provided that the "partnership shall be per-
manent, and same shall not be terminated or dissolved by either party
except upon mutual approval of both parties[.]" Since the terminating
partner breached the agreement, the court ordered a buyout under
U.P.A. § 38(2)(b). But this provision was little help to the non-breaching
partner, who could not continue the business without the patents. The
partner was rescued from the effects of dissolution at will only by the
court's decision to permit the partnership to retain the patents despite the
parties' agreement to return the patents to their owner on termination.
The court reasoned that the U.P.A. specifically provides for continuation
in this situation and that the partnership could not be continued without
the patents. Moreover, the court held that the continuing partner did
not have to pay for the patents because this was "good will" which could
be excluded from valuation under U.P.A. § 38(2)(c)(II). 94
Although the takeover-by-buyout appears to involve exploitation by
the dissociating partner of the other partners who are forced out of the
business, it is not always clear how the forced-out partners are hurt.
Why could they not borrow or hire the financial, managerial or other
resources removed by the withdrawing partner, as by taking on a replace-
ment partner? Specifically, why could not the Page defendant borrow
enough to cover his partner's demand note and hire a new manager?
One possible answer is that the squeezed-out partner could have raised
the necessary resources, but did not want to because he had a more pessi-
mistic view than the partner insisting on buyout of the worth of the busi-
ness. Under this view, the partner who ultimately takes over the business
can do so because he can extract higher returns than can the losing part-
ner, so that takeover-by-buyout may be an efficient result.
There is, however, an alternative explanation for the takeover that
casts doubt on the desirability of facilitating the takeover: The losing
partner was squeezed out not because he was unable to put the business
93. 143 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 493 N.E.2d 423 (1986).
94. 143 I11. App. 3d at 10, 493 N.E.2d at 427. For another case in which the court prevented
withdrawal of crucial property by stretching the U.P.A. see Infusaid Corp. v. Intermedics Infusaid,
Inc., 739 F. 2d 66 (Ist Cir. 1984), discussed at supra notes 66-69. In that case, the court held that a
licensor-venturer could not necessarily withdraw from a joint venture despite technical dissolution of
the partnership.
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to a better use than the winning partner, but because of the latter's inher-
ent advantages in taking over the business. This will be the case if only
the winning partner has sufficient personal wealth-including a large
stake in the partnership-to make the purchase. The other partner or
partners may attempt to borrow money or raise additional equity by of-
fering an interest in the partnership, but they must persuade the person
supplying the capital to their optimistic view of the prospects of the busi-
ness. That may be difficult because of the unavailability of reliable infor-
mation about the value of a very closely held business. The partner who
lacks personal resources therefore may be unable to match the wealthy
partner's bid, or may be able to do so only by accepting a very small
share of the profits of the business. The inherent advantages of the disso-
ciating partner are enhanced by the fact that by controlling the time of
the buyout the dissociating partner may capitalize on temporary
problems of the other partners.95
Even a partner who lacks substantial personal wealth may have a sig-
nificant advantage in competing for control if he or she has important
managerial skills. The non-manager is faced with problems similar to
those of the partner who lacks personal wealth in persuading a third
party to commit valuable human capital to the partnership. Moreover,
the non-manager may not even be able to accurately determine the value
of the business without the services of the manager-partner.96
Even if the dissociating partner can take over the business, it is still not
clear why the remaining partners are hurt. If the losers will receive their
shares of the market value of the firm's assets on sale of the business, do
they have reason to complain?
The initial response is that sale of the firm may not be conducted so as
to yield the highest possible price.97 Possible defects in the method of sale
could be mitigated by judicial supervision of the sale.9 8 But judicial over-
95. See Carney, supra note 72, at 45.
96. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 6, at 28-29.
97. This is particularly true if the assets are sold in a judicial sale. For a discussion of the
problems involved in execution sales, see LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State
Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 311, 317-18.
98. See the cases dealing with fiduciary duties of dissolving partners cited supra note 55. See
also Weiss v. Gordon, 32 A.D. 2d 279, 301 N.Y.S.2d 839 (1969). In Weiss, the court permitted
dissolution for deadlock of a close corporation, the court noting "[w]hatever respondent's share of
the business is, he will get it. Instead of forcing respondent to accept an inadequate consideration for
his share of the business, petitioner now applies to the court to make the distribution." 32 A.D.2d at
280, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 841.
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sight cannot be a complete solution because of the difficulty of accurately
valuing a partnership interest. There is no efficient market for interests
in general partnerships. A court might look for comparable businesses,
but the value of a partnership is likely to depend on characteristics that
are specific to the firm, such as the nature of services rendered, location
and the extent to which value depends on the human capital of the part-
ners. In the absence of benchmarks of going concern value, the courts
have been notably conservative in defining going concern value of a part-
nership,99 or even in determining that the partnership has going concern
value. 0 Even a court that is willing to recognize all elements of good
will may rely on historical earnings and ignore the potential effect of real,
but unproven, prospects. 01 This is particularly troublesome because,
again, the partner exercising the buyout right controls the timing of the
valuation. 102
Valuation problems are not wholly alleviated even if a court is willing
to give the non-dissociating partner the value of the business prospects of
the partnership by characterizing these prospects as opportunities that
were appropriated by the dissociating partner. The court in Page sug-
gested that the plaintiff may be liable if he "violated his fiduciary duties
by attempting to appropriate to his own use the new prosperity of the
99. Goodwill has been defined in the partnership context as "nothing more than the probability
that the old customers will resort to the old place." Cruttwell v. Lye, 17 Ves. 335, 346, 34 Eng. Rep.
129, 124 (1810). The "chief elements" of goodwill were characterized in a leading case as "con-
tinuity of place" and "continuity of name." In re Brown, 242 N.Y. 1, 150 N.E. 581 (1926). This
ignores the factors that relate to other aspects of the firm's ability to deliver its product at a competi-
tive price, including business organization, credit rating, volume and stability of demand. Thus,
goodwill, perhaps interpreted in the narrow sense of expectation of future business, has been distin-
guished from the broader "going value" of a business. Marso v. Graie, 226 Minn. 540, 33 N.W.2d
717 (1948).
100. Courts have traditionally denied the existence of goodwill in professional partnerships. See
Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 415 P.2d 667 (1966); Laube, Good Will in Professional Partner-
ships, 12 CORNELL L.Q. 303 (1927); Crane, Partnership Goodwill, 18 VA. L. REv. 651 (1932). This
ignores the fact that such partnerships may have goodwill associated with such features as organiza-
tion and place. See In re Brown, 242 N.Y. 1, 150 N.E. 581 (1926). Also, perhaps the reputations of
the partners should be considered an element of the firm's value. Some, particularly more recent,
cases have recognized goodwill in professional partnerships. As to compensation of outgoing law
partners for goodwill, see Spayd v. Turner, Granzow & Hollerkamp, 19 Ohio St. 3d 55, 482 N.W.2d
1232 (1985), noted in 20 AKRON L. REV. 157 (1986); Comment, Dissolution of a Law Partnership-
Goodwill, Winding-Up Profits and Additional Compensation, 6 J. LEG. PROF. 277 (1981).
101. For an example of reliance on historical earnings in the corporate appraisal rights context,
see, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I DuPont & Co., 224 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975).
102. See Carney, supra note 72, at 45. This may have been a particular problem in the Page case
where the dissolution occurred just as an Air Force base opened up near the partnership's linen
supply business.
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partnership without adequate compensation to his co-partner." 1° 3 It is
difficult, however, to determine the potential profits of nascent business
opportunities.' °4
Even if the squeezed-out partners received the full value of their inter-
ests, there is some question whether this would be adequate. The ousted
partners will lose the value of their firm-specific human capital-i.e.,
skills they can use only in their former firm.105 An example would be
any skills of the non-breaching partner in Pay-SaverI06 related specifi-
cally to manufacture of the machines covered by the breaching partner's
patents.
b. Other Costs
The buyout right may be costly to the other partners even if it does not
aid a takeover of the firm by the dissociating partner. Particularly in our
"model" small firm, the partners who wish to continue might have to sell
important assets in order to pay off the leaving partner. If this happens
prior to completion of a project, the start-up costs might have to be writ-
ten off at salvage value. The threat of full or partial liquidation at any
time might prevent a firm from undertaking projects that require a sub-
stantial investment with only long-range benefits.
A second problem with the buyout right focuses on use of the right to
force changes in the partners' agreement. A partner whose resources are
vital to the firm can use a threat to withdraw to obtain a rate of compen-
sation that reflects the current market value of these resources rather
than the agreement's lower value. 107 The partner can also use the threat
to withdraw to exercise a de facto veto, thus changing the agreement's
governance structure.10 8
103. 55 Cal.2d at 197, 359 P.2d at 45, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
104. See Hillman, supra note 63, at 716. Thus, the courts have permitted only reliance damages
where a partnership was wrongfully dissolved in its early stages, before potential profits could be
determined. Geczy v. La Chappelle, 636 P.2d 604 (Alas. 1981); Brand v. Elledge, 101 Ariz. 352, 419
P.2d 531 (1966); Kolb v. Dietz, 454 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. App. 1970); 69th Street Apartments, Inc. v.
Lauricella, 142 N.J. Super. 546, 362 A.2d 78 (1976), aff'd, 150 N.J. Super. 47, 374 A.2d 1222 (1977)
(corporation case applying partnership principles); Webster v. Beau, 137 P. 1013 (Wash. 1914).
105. As to firm-specific human capital see generally G. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (1964). For
a discussion of the problem in the context of takeovers of publicly held firms, see Haddock, Macey &
McChesney, Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 Va. L. Rev. 701 (1987).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
107. The use of the power to dissolve to force changes in the agreement is discussed in Hillman,
supra note 5, at 443-44, 470.
108. See id. at 452 n. 101.
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The effect of the buyout right on the partnership agreement is the dark
side of the point discussed earlier that dissociation permits partners to
react to changes in circumstances." 9 The question is whether, viewing
the matter from the perspective of the making of the bargain, the part-
ners would wish to enforce it although circumstances might later make
some of them losers. The potential benefits of an agreement that cannot
be unraveled are illustrated by the law firm setting; as discussed by Gil-
son and Mnookin, 110 the law partners may wish to share firm profits on a
strict seniority basis in order to diversify away any risks to the value of
their human capital. If the partners can dissociate without penalty at
any time,"' they can force the firm to compensate them on the basis of
their current marginal product at the expense of partners who are pro-
ducing less than at the time of the agreement. This obviously defeats the
point of diversification. The partners may prefer a rule that preserves the
substantial benefits of diversification even if they risk losing the full value
of their marginal product, assuming the potential benefits offset the po-
tential costs.
The buyout right may also make it possible for the dissociating partner
to withdraw resources he appears to own, but which he developed at firm
expense. This is particularly clear as to the leaving partner's human cap-
ital, since the partner's work in the firm may result in development of
expertise or a client base he can utilize outside the firm." 2 Similarly,
firm-paid advertising may have increased the value of the premises used
by the partnership but owned by the dissociating partner.
4. Balancing Costs and Benefits
The above discussion reveals that, while permitting dissociation at will
109. See text supra accompanying notes 87-88.
110. See Gilson and Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into
the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REv. 313 (1985).
111. Gilson and Mnookin point out that ethical rules make it impossible to wholly restrict a
lawyer's withdrawal from the firm. See id. at 337 n. 41. The authors then demonstrate how with-
drawal can be deterred in a law partnership by the development of firm-specific capital, which exists
by reason of such factors as the firm's client base and reputation. See id. at 353-71. The authors
understate the effectiveness of a no-withdrawal rule even in the law firm setting because withdrawal
would be effectively deterred if the withdrawing lawyer had no right to be paid the value of his or her
interest in the firm or to be protected from exposure to past or future firm liabilities.
112. See Carney, supra note 72 at 45 giving as an example of this problem In Re Radom &
Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954). This problem justifies enforcement of covenants
not to compete. See Rubin & Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J. LEG.
STUD. 93 (1981). See also infra note 117.
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involves substantial benefits for dissociating partners, these benefits come
at a potentially great cost to the partners who wish to continue. In light
of the costs and benefits of the dissociation right and the ex ante uncer-
tainty, would the parties to a general partnership-and particularly our
"model" small firml 13-be likely in the absence of transaction costs to
agree to dissociation at will? Several considerations suggest an affirma-
tive answer to this question.
To begin with, it is important to consider the distribution and not
merely the total amount of the costs of each alternative. For example, an
individual partner who is locked into a partnership after circumstances
cause the relationship to become onerous may suffer substantial losses in
the value of his financial and human capital over an extended period. A
partner's abusive exercise of the dissociation right may cause all of the
non-dissociating partners to give up partnership assets without adequate
compensation or to lose the benefit of firm specific human capital. But
even if the non-dissociating partners as a group might suffer a greater loss
in the event of abusive dissociation than a single locked-in partner might
suffer without a dissociation right, each partner is more likely ex ante to
focus on his risk than on the aggregate. Assuming the partners cannot
predict ex ante whether they will belong to the dissociating or the non-
dissociating group, they would want an agreement that minimized the
graver costs borne by locked-in partners. Moreover, on a more objective
basis, a loss that is spread among individuals has less impact than the
same loss borne by one individual.114
The argument in the preceding paragraph assumes that the partners
cannot and do not know ex ante whether they would want to dissociate.
That will not always be the case. For example, if, as in the Pay-Saver
case, 115 one partner contributes vital and unique resources to the partner-
ship and others contribute cash, it is likely that the former will at some
point in the relationship want to use the threat of dissociation to force
renegotiation of the bargain.116 But it does not necessarily follow that
the parties will draft around dissociation at will. Even if the capital con-
tributors outnumber the vital resource contributor, the resource contrib-
utor will have considerable leverage in negotiating the initial agreement.
113. See supra § II(E).
114. For a discussion of the benefits of risk spreading, see G. CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF Acc-
DENTS, 20-21 (1970).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
116. This problem is'discussed supra notes 107-111.
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The other partners might agree to dissociation at will in order to induce
the resource contributor to join the firm. Although the other partners
will expose themselves to the risk of a squeezeout, the agreement is not
necessarily one-sided in this respect because there is some possibility that
they will want to escape the partnership.1 17  Thus, if the dissociation
scenario is foreseeable at the outset it is more likely that the parties will
draft for dissociation than that they will draft around it.
A third consideration is that it is less costly to draft around dissocia-
tion at will than to draft for it. If the statute failed to provide a right of
exit, the partners could provide one only by settling such details as when
the right could be exercised, the terms of payment, and liabilities to cred-
itors. It will usually be easier for the partners to limit dissociation.' 18
A related point favoring dissociation at will is the availability of cost-
efficient contractual devices to protect against costly dissociation. If the
statute provides for dissociation at will, the partnership can discourage
dissociation and protect against withdrawal of human capital and other
resources by developing firm-specific capital the partners would lose by
leaving, t t9 by limiting the compensation to be paid to the dissociating
partner,1 20 by providing for payment of liquidated damages, 121 or by lim-
iting post-dissociation competition. 2 2  On the other hand, there are
117. In Pav-Saver, the parties did not agree to dissociation at will, perhaps because withdrawal of
the patent-owner would certainly destroy the firm. Thus, dissolution at will would have been one-
sided under the particular circumstances of this case.
118. I am not suggesting that the statute should provide for dissociation at will regardless of its
likely costs and benefits, but only that drafting considerations might tip the balance toward dissocia-
tion at will given that costs and benefits are both substantial.
119. See supra note 111.
120. See Osborne v. Workman, 273 Ark. 538, 621 S.W.2d 478 (1981) (departing partner denied
interest in accounts receivable); or, the provisions limit the buyout price to book value, Hagan v.
Dundore, 185 Md. 86, 43 A.2d 181 (1945) (buyout price limited to book value). As to possible non-
enforcement of provisions providing for payment of less than fair market value, see supra note 14.
For an argument that the U.P.A. provision providing for no compensation for post-dissolution serv-
ices discourages dissolution for the purpose of "grabbing" uncompleted business in law firms, see
Comment, Winding Up Dissolved Law Partnerships: The No-Compensation Rule and Client Choice,
73 CAL. L. REv. 1597, 1606 (1985).
121. For an example of a partnership dissolution case in which a liquidated damages provision
was enforced, see Pav-Saver Corp. v. Vasso Corp., 143 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 493 N.E.2d 423 (1986).
122. As to the use of non-competition agreements in controlling taking of human capital devel-
oped at firm expense, see Rubin & Shedd, supra note 112. Enforceability of non-competes may be
less of a problem in the partnership than in other contexts because it is likely that the agreement was
the product of fair and equal bargaining. See Foti v. Cook, 263 S.E.2d 430 (Va. 1980); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 188, Illus. 11-13; Closius and Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude:
The Current Judicial Enforcement of Employee Covenants Not to Compete-A Proposal for Reform,
57 S. CAL. L. REV. 531, 554-56 (1984).
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fewer cost-effective devices for protecting against the costs of illiquidity.
The most effective protection is fiduciary duties, but these are vague, un-
predictable and costly to enforce and do not address costs resulting from
changes in circumstances that do not involve partner misconduct.
5. Suggested Approach
It follows from the foregoing that the statute should, at a minimum,
permit each partner to dissociate at will by terminating his investment
and obligations to co-partners and creditors. Accordingly, Section 1.01
of my proposed statute (set forth in Part VIII) provides for dissociation
in circumstances similar to those in which the partnership is dissolved
under U.P.A. §§ 29, 31 and 32, including withdrawal by voluntary act
(Section 1.01(a)(1)). The lead-in to Section 1.01, by specifying that the
dissociating partner "ceases to be a partner" on occurrence of an event of
dissociation, effects termination of the partner's obligations to co-part-
ners. 123 Section 1.02 sets forth the rights of the dissociating partner to be
paid by the partnership-i.e., to terminate his investment in the partner-
ship. Section 1.02 provides for payment of the fair value of the partner's
interest, but facilitates continuation of the firm by the other partners by
permitting deferred payments. 24 The dissociating partner terminates his
credit contribution as to post-dissociation debts pursuant to Section 1.03,
which is drawn from U.P.A. § 35.
D. Liquidation Right
1. The Benefits of Liquidation
The liquidation right as used here refers to a partner's right to exit the
partnership through a sale of the assets of the partnership and not merely
a buyout by the other partners at a price fixed by the court. Although an
asset sale can result from the buyout right where the non-dissociating
partners are unable to arrange a buyout, there is a separate question
whether the dissociating partner should have a right to insist on sale and
thereby override the preference of the other partners.
This Section discusses the liquidation right distinct from the dissociat-
ing partner's right to have the liabilities discharged. U.P.A. § 38(1).links
123. U.P.A. §§ 20 and 21 should be amended in light of the provision in Section 1.01 for cessa-
tion of partner status to protect former partners prior to settlement of their interests under Section
1.02.
124. 1 base Section 1.02(d), which provides for deferred payments, on the Hetherington and
Dooley proposal for close corporation buyouts, Hetherington and Dooley, supra note 6, at 56-58.
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liquidation and discharge by requiring application of assets to the pay-
ment of liabilities. However, as I discuss in Section V(D), whether liabil-
ities are discharged involves issues separate from those involved in
liquidation without discharge.
One justification for the liquidation right is that a sale of the assets is a
better way of determining the value of the partnership than relying on a
judicially supervised guess. 125 Ensuring full valuation of partnership in-
terests lowers the costs of dissociation and commensurately increases the
effectiveness of dissociation as a counter to exploitation and changes in
circumstances. Also, a market test of valuation may conserve judicial
resources that would otherwise be committed to the difficult task of
valuation.
A second benefit of the liquidation right is its even-handedness among
the partners. Because no partner has a legal advantage in acquiring the
business, as is the case when a partner exercises a right to be bought out
by the other partners, the market alone determines the identity of the
buyer.' 26 This helps to ensure that the partner who can best use the
partnership assets (because that partner is willing to pay a higher price
for them) acquires them.
2. The Costs of the Liquidation Right
It has been said that a negative aspect of the liquidation right is that it
destroys the going concern value of the firm. 127 In fact, if, and only if,
the partnership business is worth more alive than dead, someone-either
a partner or a third party-will purchase it as a going concern.1 2 8 That
is particularly so if, as is assumed in this Section, the liquidation right is
not coupled with a right to have the liabilities discharged.
The more important problem with the liquidation right is that, as com-
pared with buyout, the liquidation right makes it easier for the stronger
125. See STORY, supra note 56. at 496-7 note 4, 500-01. Similarly, some have argued that a
market auction under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. §§ 701, et. seq.) is preferable to
giving the existing claimants the right to take the firm at a valuation under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et.seq.). T. JACKSON, supra note 23, at 222-23; Roe, Bankruptcy
and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1983).
126. See STORY, supra note 56, at 502-03.
127. See Bromberg, Partnership Dissolution-Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 43 TEX. L. REV.
631, 647 (1965).
128. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 6, at 26, 33 and 50 (survey of close corporation
dissolution cases demonstrated that dissolution rarely, if ever, results in loss of going concern value).
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partner to take over the business. For example, in Prentiss v. Sheffel, t29
two partners owning an aggregate 85% interest in the partnership dis-
solved the firm and then purchased its assets at a judicial sale; this ac-
complished the expulsion of the remaining 15% partner. The excluded
partner (defendant) complained that plaintiffs could bid "paper" dollars
due to their 85% interest-i.e., could acquire the firm by purchasing only
the small fraction they did not own-and that the plaintiffs' attorney
chilled the sale to a third party by announcing that his clients were pre-
pared to go to three million dollars (the sale price was a little over two
million). The court, finding no misconduct, confirmed the sale.t30
If the "dissociating" partners in Prentiss had had only a right to be
bought out, the defendant would have had an opportunity to buy at a
judicially set price. In a liquidation, on the other hand, the "dissociat-
ing" partners could use their investment in the firm to bid even higher
than the actual value of the firm, and certainly higher than the value a
court would have fixed in light of judicial conservatism concerning
"goodwill." '131 Even if the defendant had borrowed against the "hard"
assets of the business, he might not have been able to outbid the plaintiffs'
"paper dollars." Although the plaintiffs' position in this case was so
strong that it is unlikely defendant could have acquired the firm even in a
buyout, the case illustrates how liquidation can strengthen a dissociating
partner's position.
In Prentiss, the auction process may have resulted in payment to de-
fendant of a price that fairly reflected the market value of the firm's as-
sets and was actually higher than the price defendant would have
received if the plaintiffs had not participated in the bidding. But this is
significant only if defendant wanted to leave the partnership. If the sale
facilitated a squeeze-out of defendant, defendant may have incurred sub-
stantial costs as a result of the takeover even if he was paid a "fair"
price.
132
129. 20 Ariz. App. 411, 513 P.2d 949 (1973).
130. For other cases dealing with the fairness of judicial sales of the partnership see supra note
49.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 99-102.
132. See supra discussion at notes 105-106. Moreover, the auction approach does not ensure
that the partner who is best able to use the assets in fact acquires them because the high bidder may
have an inherent bidding advantage rather than simply being willing to pay a higher price. See supra
text accompanying notes 95-96.
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3. Balancing Costs and Benefits
Would the partners be likely to conclude that the increased risk of
squeeze-out from the right to liquidate at will outweighs its benefits in
terms of lowering the cost of exit? To answer this question, it is helpful
to look more closely at the most likely scenarios involving exercise of the
liquidation right. The liquidation right is likely to yield its principal ben-
efit of facilitating payment of full value when the partnership business
has substantial going concern value-i.e., is not merely holding assets.
The good will component of value is the most difficult to measure be-
cause it is determined by unique characteristics of businesses and because
exact comparables are impossible to find.
Whether the liquidation right will lead to an adequate going concern
value depends largely on whether there is an active auction for the part-
nership business as a going concern. That auction is unlikely to happen
unless the partners participate in the auction. The partners usually will
be the highest bidders for a going business because they have an informa-
tion cost advantage over outsiders and because they may include in their
bid elements of value that are irrelevant to third parties, particularly in-
cluding the value of the partners' own firm-specific human capital that
they will lose if they leave the business.133
An inter-partner auction for the business probably will not occur with-
out the participation of the electing partner. Although more than one of
the continuing partners probably will wish to take over the business, it is
unlikely that they will suddenly decide to compete with each other for
control simply because a partner has decided to leave. Thus, the compe-
tition for the firm that is essential for full valuation usually will occur on
liquidation at will only if the partner who exercises the liquidation right
also seeks control. In other words, liquidation at the will of a partner is
likely to yield its greatest benefit in terms of accurate valuation of the
partnership precisely when the liquidation right is most likely to be used
as a mechanism to take over the business.
In light of the above discussion, the parties to a partnership relation-
ship would not be likely to give each partner the right to liquidate at will.
Because liquidation at will is ordinarily beneficial in terms of valuation of
the partnership assets only if accompanied by a costly squeezeout, liqui-
dation at will offers the partners only the opportunity to be on the win-
ning side of a zero-sum reallocation of values among the partners. If the
133. See supra text accompanying notes 105-106.
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partners do not know ex ante whether they will be winners or losers, they
have little to gain by gambling in this way. If the partners can predict
who will benefit from a liquidation right, it is unlikely the potential losers
will agree unless they are offered strong inducements under a customized
agreement. By comparison, the buyout right is desireable because it of-
fers all of the partners, including those who are unlikely to be able to use
the buyout as a squeeze-out device, a cost-efficient way to reduce the
substantial risks associated with illiquidity.
4. When Liquidation is Appropriate
Although the partners would be unlikely to agree that a single partner
should have the right to compel liquidation of the partnership at any
time, situations exist where liquidation is appropriate.
First, the firm should be liquidated if the partners unanimously so de-
cide. By extension, liquidation is also appropriate on the termination
date set in the agreement because this is, in effect, a unanimous vote to
liquidate taken at the outset of the partnership. 134
The serious question as to consensual liquidation is whether liquida-
tion should be permitted on the basis of a sub-unanimous vote. Although
this might facilitate a squeeze-out of the dissenting partner or partners,
the majority could probably effect a squeeze-out in all events by exerciz-
ing their buyout right because it is unlikely the minority could muster the
resources for a buyout.135 However, the disparity in financial interests
between the majority and the minority is not necessarily determinative.
The majority's liquidation right is meaningful if the minority has a bid-
ding advantage because of its management position. Thus, a sub-unani-
mous liquidation right might be useful in some cases to protect against
exploitive conduct by a managing partner. This situation will most likely
exist in our "model" small firm 36 where the abilities of a single partner
may loom relatively large.
A single partner should be able to compel liquidation, as opposed to
merely obtaining buyout, upon a judicial determination that the business
of the partnership is no longer viable. A business is no longer viable if
134. It is important to distinguish the effect of termination of an agreed term or undertaking
under an agreement that the partnership shall terminate at this time from the problem of premature
dissociation. See infra text accompanying notes 167-171.
135. This is illustrated by the Prentiss case, where the owners of 85% of the firm dissociated the
firm. See supra text accompanying notes 129-13 1.
136. See supra § II (B).
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the business is unlawful '3 7 or a losing proposition with no prospects of
success.l"' Liquidation of such a business cannot facilitate takeover of a
going concern and will minimize the partners' costs of exit where exit is
particularly desirable.
Judicial liquidation upon request of a single partner is also appropriate
in the event of partner exploitation. 139 In this situation, the added benefit
of the liquidation right in deterring misconduct serves to counterbalance
its costs. Moreover, since liquidation on this ground is likely to be
sought by the weaker partner, it probably will not facilitate a squeeze-
out.
A single partner also should be able to have judicial liquidation on the
basis of partner deadlock. Because deadlock is more likely where there is
disagreement among active managers rather than between managing and
non-managing partners, liquidation on a showing of deadlock presents a
relatively low risk of facilitating takeover by a strong partner. Also, the
"evenhandedness" of liquidation'" is of primary importance in this situ-
ation: Liquidation may be the only fair way of determining which part-
ner or faction should have the business when they cannot run it together.
Although granting a liquidation right upon deadlock might perversely
encourage a partner who wishes to liquidate to force a deadlock, charac-
terizing such conduct as a breach of fiduciary duty can minimize this
risk.
Finally, liquidation is appropriate if the partnership fails to buy out the
interest of a partner who exercises his buyout right. This "back-up" liq-
uidation is necessary in order to effectuate the partners' basic dissociation
right. Although liquidation in this situation may be costly, as where it
facilitates squeeze-out, the benefits of dissociation at will outweigh these
costs.
137. U.P.A. § 31(3) provides for dissolution when it becomes unlawful to carry on the business
"or for the members to carry it on in partnership." 6 U.L.A. at 376. In the latter situation, a more
appropriate remedy might be the severing of the "unlawful" partner. Although no judicial determi-
nation is necessary under U.P.A. § 31(3), this issue is sufficiently likely to be disputed that judicial
determination should be required.
138. U.P.A. § 32(1)(e) provides for judicial dissolution when "[t]he business of the partnership
can only be carried on at a loss" 6 U.L.A. at 394.
139. The appropriate standard of misconduct is discussed infra in § VII(C) in connection with
whether dissociation should be permitted in this situation even in the face of a contrary agreement.
As discussed infra text accompanying note 192, misconduct might be a basis of expulsion of the
wrongdoing partner rather than liquidation.
140. See supra text accompanying note 126.
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Sections 1.04 and 1.05 of the proposed statute provide for liquidation
and winding up in the situations discussed in this subsection.
E. Liquidation with Discharge
Should the liquidating partner be entitled to discharge of liabilities as
distinguished from merely assumption of liabilities by the continuing
partners? Liquidation clearly need not involve discharge. The business,
together with its liabilities, could simply be transferred to new owners,
subject to limitations on assignment of contractual obligations.
The obvious benefit of the discharge right is that the dissociating part-
ners can sever their connection from the firm more completely than if the
liabilities are merely assumed by the continuing partners, and so they can
reinvest capital and credit in other ventures. The position of the dissoci-
ating partners is particularly sympathetic in that, if they cannot obtain
discharge, they will continue as uncompensated financial backers of the
partnership. 141
Discharge does, however, entail two types of costs. First, discharge
makes it more difficult to carry on the business as a going concern. The
right to compel discharge does not necessarily prevent continuation of
the business. The debts may be small in relation to assets, or the dissoci-
ating partner may be an unimportant credit source (i.e., judgment proof)
so that the partnership's creditors will readily agree to discharge. The
partners who wish to continue also may be able to avoid discharge by
compensating the dissociating partner for his guarantee. In other situa-
tions, discharge may have a significant effect on whether the business can
be continued. If the debts are high in relation to assets or if the dissociat-
ing partner is an important source of the partnership's credit, as will
likely be the case in our relatively small "model" firm, the creditors may
insist on payment as a condition of granting discharge. Because the risk
is greatest in these situations, the price of the dissociating partner's guar-
antee is likely to be high.
Second, even if the discharge right does not result in loss of going con-
cern value, exercise of the right may facilitate takeover by the faction of
partners best able to put up the additional ante, therefore entailing the
costs discussed in Section V(C)(3).
Although discharge adds both costs and benefits to liquidation, the
141. By comparison, as I discuss in the following paragraph, partners who can insist on dis-
charge can sell this right for an amount sufficient to cover the risk of guaranteeing partnership debts.
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situations that call for the liquidation right also justify liquidation with
discharge. In the majority vote situation, whether the dissenting partner
or partners must cover the partnership debts as a cost of continuing the
partnership will probably not affect their abilty to win a bidding contest
with the liquidating majority. Moreover, if the majority concludes that
termination of the business is appropriate, there is little reason to fear
loss of substantial going concern value because the interests of the major-
ity are likely to be aligned with those of the partnership as a whole. If
the partnership is no longer viable, the discharge right obviously will not
result in takeover or in loss of going concern value.
When the firm is liquidated because of the misconduct of a partner, the
fact that the plaintiff will not usually be the controlling partner means
that the right to obtain discharge probably will not facilitate a takeover
by the plaintiff or threaten the viability of the firm. If there are costs in
this situation because of discontinuity of the firm, the most appropriate
remedy is expulsion of the misbehaving partner rather than liquida-
tion. 42 If liquidation with discharge in response to partner misconduct is
both necessary and costly, the deterrent value of the discharge right
counterbalances the extra costs. Dissociation is cheaper and therefore
more effective in curbing partner misconduct if an exploited partner can
dissociate without guaranteeing pre-dissociation debts.
The discharge right is not excessively costly in the deadlock situation.
Although discharge may threaten the viability of the firm, if the deadlock
is sufficiently serious that a partner is willing to press for liquidation de-
spite the potential loss of going concern value, this may signal that the
business should be discontinued. If, as will often be the case in the event
of deadlock, the parties are co-managers, the added burden of discharge
may be enough to facilitate a squeeze-out that might not have occurred
without the discharge right. But the benefit of the discharge right in
resolving costly disharmony counterbalances this cost. If neither partner
can dissociate without guaranteeing future liabilities, the deadlock is
likely to continue. But if either partner can make a clean break, he will
do so or the partners will resolve their differences to reap the greater
benefits of preserving the firm.
Consistently with the foregoing, Section 1.04 of the suggested statute
provides, as does U.P.A. § 38(1), that upon sale of the partnership assets,
the proceeds must be applied to discharge of the partnership's liabilities.
142. See infra text accompanying note 192.
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F Dissolution
L The Benefits of Dissolution
Despite the central role of dissolution under the U.P.A., it is not im-
mediately clear why the partnership must dissolve in order to effectuate a
partner's departure. The proposed statute terminates obligations among
the partners by providing for the cessation of partner status (Section
1.01). The statute also terminates the dissociating partner's investment
through buyout (Section 1.02) or sale of assets (Section 1.03) and termi-
nates obligations to post-dissociation creditors (Section 1.04) all without
dissolving the partnership entity.
Because dissolution operates with regard to the partnership entity, the
need for dissolution relates to the function and existence of the partner-
ship entity. The U.P.A. definition of partnership is neutral on whether a
partnership is a legal entity or an aggregation of the partners, 143 and the
Act itself includes both aggregate and entity-based features. 1" The
U.P.A. appears to adopt the aggregate approach as to dissolution because
although the firm dissolves, it does so upon dissociation of any member,
and so has no life apart from the individuals associated with it. 145 But
the partnership is a separate entity for many purposes outside the U.P.A.
For example, a partnership can generally sue and be sued in its own
name. 146 To the extent that a partnership is a separate entity, it is impor-
143. Under U.P.A. § 6(1), the partnership business is carried on not by a "legal person" but by
an "association of two or more persons... as co-owners." The Commissioners' Notes state that the
characterization of partners as co-owners is intended to clarify that they have the "power of ultimate
control." 6 U.L.A. at 22-23. Thus, the statement that partners are co-owners is apparently not
intended as a statement that the business is to be identified with the partners.
144. Aggregate characteristics include joint or joint and several liability of the partners (U.P.A.
§ 15, 6 U.L.A. at 174) and, at least nominally, ownership of partnership property by the partners
rather than by the partnership (U.P.A. § 25, 6 U.L.A. at 326). Entity features include the ability of
the firm to hold title to property (U.P.A. §§ 8(3), 10(1), 6 U.L.A. at 115, 155), characterization of
the partner as agent of the partnership (U.P.A. § 9, 6 U.L.A. at 132-33), and internal financial
relationships between the partner and the firm (U.P.A. § 18(a)-(d), 6 U.L.A. at 213).
145. See S. ROWLEY, ROWLEY ON PARTNERSHIP 605-06 (2d ed. 1960) (death of a partner dis-
solves the partnership because the "principal" is destroyed); Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 24
YALE L.J. 617, 627 (1915) (dissolution constitutes the end of carrying on of the business in a particu-
lar partnership). The aggregate approach is, however, moderated in that the partnership business
may survive dissolution under U.P.A. § 38(2) and 42, 6 U.L.A. at 456-57, 521, and the continuing
business in some situations is deemed to automatically assume liabilities of the old business under
U.P.A. § 41, 6 U.L.A. at 509-10.
146. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b); Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 714 P.2d
155 (Mont. 1986) (partnership could sue in its own name even in the absence of explicit statutory
authority). Consistently with the entity theory, a suit against the partners individually does not give
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tant for both the partners and third parties to know the identity of the
entity that is conducting the partnership business.
2. The Costs of Dissolution
Dissolution introduces uncertainty regarding relationships with third
parties because it may operate to discharge contractual obligations.
147
The parties to these relationships would probably want them to change
or terminate only if the identity of the business substantially changed and
not if the dissolution was a merely technical one caused by the dissocia-
tion of a single partner. The parties can, of course, agree that technical
dissolution will not affect their executory contracts, but a statute that
anticipates such agreements can reduce transaction costs.
3. Suggested Approach
It follows from the above discussion that a partnership, like a corpora-
tion, should not dissolve merely as a result of changes in ownership be-
cause partners and third parties contracting with the partnership would
not want or expect their agreements to change or terminate in this situa-
tion. An important difference between partnerships and corporations,
however, is that while a corporate entity is created formally and can be
dissolved only by a formal procedure, partnership is an informal relation-
ship. Thus, just as the partnership statute must describe the elements of
the relationship that signify partnership'48 so it must describe the
changes in the business that the parties would expect to result in the
creation of a new entity.
We can derive some guidance as to the parties' expectations regarding
dissolution from U.P.A. § 41. This provision addresses the relevant issue
of when partnership obligations should carry over to a successor firm.
The partnership's 149 liability carries over to the successor if the business
is continued by at least one of the partners in the old firm. Although a
complete change in ownership does not alone dissolve a corporation,
the plaintiff a right to damages from the partnership. Morse v. Mayberry, 183 Neb. 89, 157 N.W.2d
881 (1968). Also, the absence of the sole general partner from the jurisdiction does not toll the
statute of limitations against the partnership. Epstein v. Frank, 125 Cal. App. 2d 111, 177 Cal. Rptr.
831 (1981) (noting that the partnership is procedurally an entity and could be served through a
designated agent).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
148. See U.P.A. §§ 6 and 7, 6 U.L.A. at 22, 38-9.
149. The individual liability of the partners continues until discharged pursuant to U.P.A. § 36,
6 U.L.A. at 436.
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such a change should result in a different partnership entity because the
owners of a partnership actively manage the business and are liable for its
debts under the U.P.A. and therefore are more identified with their busi-
ness than are the passive shareholders of the standard form corporation.
U.P.A. § 41 should not, however, be used as a definition of continuity
to the extent that the carryover to the successor firm depends on assign-
ment of rights or consent to continuation by the withdrawing partner or
estate.1 50 The ex-partner's or executor's consent to continuation should
not matter because the liability of the new firm helps the ex-partner by
minimizing the effect of his continued personal liability. Also, the ex-
partner's consent is irrelevant to the expectation of a third party as to
whether a new firm has been created.
Perhaps the most difficult question with regard to the continuity of the
entity concerns incorporation of the partnership. U.P.A. § 41(4) pro-
vides that there is no automatic assumption if the firm is continued exclu-
sively by persons not partners of the dissolved partnership. This prevents
carryover if the successor is a corporation, even if the corporation is
owned by all of the partners in the old firm. If the business is continued
on the same basis, the change wrought by incorporation appears merely
technical. Although the change from individual liability of the partners
to limited liability affects third parties, this change only affects post-in-
corporation creditors. Pre-incorporation creditors would undoubtedly
prefer to have their liabilities assumed by the new firm, as long as the
personal liability of the partners continued. On the other hand, except-
ing the corporation situation would present formidable drafting
problems: What must the former partners' interest in the corporation be
in order to prevent dissolution? What if the partnership was owned by
two or more corporations that sold their interests to other corporations?
On balance, it is preferable to require the partnership to deal explicitly
with the incorporation situation by agreement.
The circumstances under which the partnership dissolves should to
some extent be subject to control by the partnership agreement. Because
dissolution may adversely affect the rights of third parties, the partners
should not be able to provide by agreement solely among themselves for
dissolution in circumstances in addition to those set forth in the statute.
However, the partners should be able to avoid statutory causes, as by
150. See U.P.A. § 41(1)-(3), 6 U.L.A. 509-10.
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agreeing that the partnership entity merges with a successor corporation
rather than dissolving.
In summary, the theory of partnership dissolution should be changed
from the U.P.A.'s extreme aggregate approach of wholly identifying the
business entity with the individual owners, to the entity approach pursu-
ant to which the business organization exists to some extent apart from
the identity of its owners. Section 1.06 of the suggested statute reflects
this change: the partnership dissolves only upon complete change of
membership unless the agreement even further limits the circumstances
in which the entity dissolves.
VI. AGREED TERM OR UNDERTAKING
A. Penalizing Premature Dissociation
The previous section considered statutory dissociation provisions that
operate when the partners have made no relevant agreement. This Sec-
tion considers whether the partner's buyout right should be limited by an
uncompleted agreed term or undertaking. The fact that the partners
have specified a duration implies that the partners intended dissociation
prior to the expiration of the term to be on a different basis from dissocia-
tion that is not premature. If the partners have not specified how the
prematurity affects the basis of dissociation, the statutory standard form
must fill the blanks in the parties' agreement.
Because the U.P.A. fully develops the consequences of an agreed term
or undertaking, I use the U.P.A. provisions as the starting point for anal-
ysis. The U.P.A. makes a substantial distinction between dissolution
"without violation of the agreement between the partners" under Section
31(1) and "in contravention of the agreement" under Section 31(2). In
the latter situation, U.P.A. Section 38(2) provides that the contravening
partner has no right to application of assets and must not only pay dam-
ages for breach but forego compensation for goodwill of the partnership.
The fact that there is an uncompleted agreed term or undertaking may
say something about the costs of the exercise of a buyout of liquidation
right. Such an agreement may indicate that the parties intended to invest
toward completion of a long-term project like publication of a bookl"' as
distinguished from incurring expenditures (such as for inventory) that
will yield near term returns. These investments may be in tangible assets
151. See Shawn v. England, 570 P.2d 628 (Okla. App. 1977) (squeezeout of a partner from such
a project prior to publication).
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such as equipment or in the development of skills that can only be used
in connection with the agreed undertaking-i.e., in firm-specific human
capital. A partner who dissociates prematurely may, by purchasing the
assets of the business and using expertise he acquired in the partnership,
appropriate the prospects of the business.' 52
The above problems often cannot be fully redressed by assessing dam-
ages against the breaching partner because of the speculative nature of
damages relating to future, hypothetical events.' 53 U.P.A. § 38(2)(c)(II),
in denying the wrongful partner a share in the partnership good will,
attempting rough justice in light of the weakness of the damage rem-
edy. 1 54 Moreover, the reduced purchase price, together with the inno-
cent partners' rights under the U.P.A. to merely assume rather than
discharge partnership debts and to secure payment by bond rather than
pay the value of the dissolving partners' interest,' 5 properly minimizes
the chance that the wrongful partner will be able to appropriate the un-
completed undertaking.' 56
B. Premature Dissociation Without Penalty
1. In General
U.P.A. § 31(2) provides that dissolution is caused "in contravention of
the agreement between the partners" only if it is "by the express will of
any partner," and not "where the circumstances.., permit a dissolution
under any other provision of this section." Therefore, dissolution is not
in contravention even if there is an unexpired term or undertaking if the
dissolution was caused by unlawfulness of the partnership, death or
bankruptcy of a partner or partner incapacity or incompetence, the fact
that the business can only be carried on at a loss, or other equitable cir-
cumstances. In these situations, any partner can have the firm liquidated
under U.P.A. § 38(1). Moreover, even if dissolution is in contravention
under U.P.A. § 31(2), any innocent partner has a right to liquidate the
152. See supra § V(C)(3)(a).
153. See supra note 104.
154. See Hillman, supra note 5, at 552-53.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
156. For an example of a case in which the court facilitated continuation of the firm by not
requiring the continuing partner to pay a wrongfully terminating partner for "goodwill" in the form
of patents used by the partnership, see Pay-Saver Corp. v. Vasso Corp., 143 Il. App. 3d 1013, 493
N.E.2d 423 (1986), discussed supra, text accompanying notes 93-94.
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firm under U.P.A. § 38(2). Should premature dissociation be penalized
in these situations as well?
2. Disabled and Bankrupt Partners
Disabled partners or the estate of a deceased should have a right of
unpenalized withdrawal because, unlike able partners who may merely
suffer increased costs from continued association with the partnership,'57
the disabled partner or estate undergoes a transformation in the type of
risk undertaken. The partner initially agreed to be subjected to the risks
of partnership in return for the ability to monitor and control the activi-
ties of the other partners. The disabled partner or estate must remain
exposed to risk while losing control. Allowing the partner's representa-
tive or estate to substitute for the disabled or deceased partner as a solu-
tion to this problem is inconsistent with the principle of delectus
personarum.' 58 Even if the able partners are willing to admit the repre-
sentative or executor, this sort of proxy monitoring changes the initial
deal of direct participation by the partner. Consequently, the partners
would be likely to agree that, despite an agreed term or undertaking,
disabled partners or estates can escape the partnership without penalty.
The same result should follow as to bankrupt partners, but for differ-
ent reasons. Bankruptcy of a partner does not, like disability, prevent the
partner from participating in the partnership. A bankrupt partner's part-
nership interest does become property of the bankruptcy estate' 59 and so
may be assigned to a trustee. But this interest is financial only and does
not include the partner's right to participate in management.' 6° Bank-
ruptcy is significant because it may terminate the partner's credit contri-
bution as to pre-bankruptcy debts16 1 and usually signals the partner's
inability to pay debts in the near future. This withdrawal of credit signif-
icantly changes the basis of the partner's deal with the other partners.
157. See supra § V(C)(2).
158. See J. STORY, supra note 52, at 445-46 (1841).
159. See Bankruptcy Code § 541(a)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982) (property of the estate in-
cludes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case").
160. For authority favoring partner bankruptcy as a cause of dissolution because it may result in
assignment of the partner's interest to a trustee, see Marquand v. New York Mfg. Co., 17 Johns 525,
528-29 (Ct. Errors, 1820).
161. Completion of a Chapter 7 liquidation under Bankruptcy Code Section 727, 11 U.S.C.
§ 727 or a Chapter 11 reorganization, Bankruptcy Code § 1141, 11 U.S.C. § 1141 may discharge a
partner from pre-bankruptcy debts. The debtor is not discharged until completion of payments
under the plan in a Chapter 13 reorganization, Bankruptcy Code § 1328, 11 U.S.C. § 1328.
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Also, to the extent that the partner is unable to share in the burden of
partnership debts, the partner's incentives are not aligned with those of
the other partners, and so he should not have the power to bind the part-
nership in transactions with third parties. 162 Because dissociation in the
event of partner bankruptcy is in the interests of the partnership as a
whole rather than of the bankrupt partner, and because the bankruptcy is
not likely to have been intentionally manipulated in order to obtain relief
from a partnership for a term or to effect a squeeze-out of the other part-
ners, the dissociation should not be penalized even if it is premature.
It does not follow from the above that bankruptcy of the partnership
should permit premature dissociation. U.P.A. § 31(5) provides for disso-
lution in this situation whether or not there is an unexpired agreed term
or undertaking. The partnership statute should not, however, discourage
the partners from reorganizing the business under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Thus, the statute should not permit premature disso-
ciation unless the partnership voluntarily or involuntarily liquidates
under Chapter 7 of the Code.163
3. Other Partners
As discussed at the beginning of this Section, the U.P.A. permits un-
penalized departure not only by estates and disabled partners, but also by
nondissolving partners whether or not they are disabled or insolvent.
Under what circumstances should a nondisabled solvent partner be per-
mitted to escape the partnership without penalty despite an unexpired
agreed term or undertaking?
The response to this question distinguishes between events that involve
a single partner-i.e., death, disability or partner bankruptcy-and those
that affect the entire partnership. The only justification for disregarding
the unexpired term in the first type of situation is that the dissociation of
any partner materially changes the basis of the partnership.'" But the
existence of a definite term or undertaking implies that the partners have
162. Thus, U.P.A. § 35(3)(b) provides that a bankrupt partner has no authority to represent the
firm after dissolution even as to winding up transactions. 6 U.L.A. at 43.
163. See In Re Safren 65 B.R. 566 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (no dissolution upon Chapter II bankruptcy
of partner or partnership). As discussed in subsection VI(B)(3) infra, liquidation of the firm by
consent or because the firm is no longer viable (which would be the case if it cannot be reorganized
in bankruptcy) would justify dissociation without penalty.
164. See III KENT'S COMMENTARIES 56 (14th ed. 1896): The "abilities and skill, or characteris-
tics and credit, of the deceased were the inducements to the formation of the connection." See also
id. at 58 and 62 concerning dissolution by partner insanity and incapacity.
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invested substantial resources toward the realization of a long-term goal.
Under these circumstances, the partners would probably prefer to maxi-
mize the possibility of continuation until completion and minimize the
chance that one partner could, by leaving, appropriate the benefit of the
object of the partnership. Moreover, contrary to the U.P.A. assumption
that every partner induced the partnership relationship, it is much more
likely that the partnership consists both of entrepreneurs (who contrib-
uted unique managerial skills) and of capital contributers (who are more
fungible). Since the standard form cannot practicably differentiate
among contributers, it would be best to leave it to the partners them-
selves to agree to liquidate in the event of dissociation of a crucial part-
ner. Therefore, the departure of one partner should not change the
consequences of premature termination for the others.
Despite the existence of an unexpired term, a partner should have a
right to dissociate by compelling liquidation in the situations identified in
Section V(D)(4), including nonviability, unanimous or majority vote,
partner misconduct and deadlock. In all of these situations, the results
expected from the agreed duration are unlikely to be achieved, and rela-
tively little danger exists that dissociation will cause loss or appropriation
of going concern value. The existence of an unexpired agreed term or
undertaking and the likely attendant costs of premature dissociation do,
however, justify use of remedies less drastic than liquidation if possible.
Hence, if the partners cannot practicably carry on the partnership be-
cause of the presence of a particular partner whose participation is un-
lawful or whose conduct is dishonest or obstreperous, the appropriate
remedy may be expulsion of the illegal or misbehaving partner.'65 If
partner misconduct does not prevent the carrying on of the partnership
business,1 66 the appropriate remedy may be assessment of damages
against the misbehaving partner for breach of fiduciary duty.
165. This can be effected under the current version of the U.P.A. by obtaining a judicial dissolu-
tion based on the misconduct of a partner. The misbehaving partner then would probably be charac-
terized as having wrongfully caused dissolution and therefore would be subject to a buyout at fair
value less goodwill and less damages.
166. U.P.A. § 32(l)(c) permits judicial dissolution where a partner's conduct merely "affect[s]
prejudicially the carrying on of the business." 6 U.L.A. at 394. U.P.A. § 32(l)(d) permits dissolu-
tion where a partner "wilfully or persistently commits a breach of the partnership agreement, or
otherwise so conducts himself in matters relating to the partnership business that it is not reasonably
practicable to carry on the business in partnership with him." 6 U.L.A. at 394. It is not clear
whether the "not reasonably practicable" clause qualifies dissolution in the event of persistent
breach.
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C. What is an Agreed Term or Undertaking?
An agreed term or undertaking that has the consequences outlined in
the preceding two subsections is one that indicates an intent that the
partnership last at least until expiration or completion. For example, in
69th Street Apartments, Inc. v. Lauricella,I6 7 the court, applying partner-
ship principles in a corporation case, held that, in light of the money,
time, and effort required, the shareholders intended that the corporation
would continue until completion of the building the partnership was
formed to construct. This should be distinguished from a term that
merely limits duration, which is significant only in causing the partner-
ship to terminate when the limit is reached.168 Consistent with this rea-
soning, dissolution was held not in contravention when the partnership
was to terminate on death of a partner.1 69 On the other hand, some
courts have held that a partnership could not be rightfully dissolved prior
to the expiration of a lease or franchise under which the partnership op-
erated, 170 or where the partnership term extended into the next cen-
tury.17 1 If it is unclear whether the parties intended a maximum or
minimum term, perhaps a term specified in an apparently comprehensive
agreement without provision for the consequences of premature dissocia-
tion should be presumed only to limit duration.
A more difficult question concerns agreements that arguably imply a
duration by, for example, providing for payment of initial financing out
of operating income. Such an agreement may represent no more than a
hope that things will work out rather than an intent to penalize with-
drawal prior to repayment of the financing.'17
167. 142 N.J. Super. 546, 362 A.2d 78 (1976), aff'd 150 N.J. Super. 47, 374 A.2d 1222 (1977).
168. It is not clear whether the U.P.A. supports limiting the effect of an agreed term in this way.
§ 31(1)(b) provides that dissolution by express will of a single partner is "without violation" of the
agreement ifthere is no definite term or undertaking. On the other hand, it is difficult to see how
dissolution by express will or withdrawal can be "in contravention" of the partnership agreement
under U.P.A. Section 31(2) if the agreement sets only a limit on duration. As to the appropriateness
of liquidating the firm when the limit is reached see supra note 134.
169. Stone v. Stone, 292 So.2d 686 (La. 1974).
170. Zeibak v. Nasser, 12 Cal. 2d 1, 82 P.2d 375 (1938) (lease); Bates v. McTammany, 10 Cal. 2d
697, 76 P.2d 513 (1938) (government license of radio station). Cf Campbell v. Miller, 274 N.C,
1430, 161 S.E.2d 546 (1968) (partnership formed by lease of property was at will where lease was at
will).
171. Infusaid Corp. v. Intermedics Infusaid, Inc., 739 F.2d 661 (1st Cir. 1984) (agreement pro-
vided for continuation until 2030). See Stanton v. Tarantino, 637 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D. Pa. 1986)
(provision for continuation until 2020 constituted partnership for a term). See also Hillman, supra
note 59, at 708 n.93.
172. See Page v. Page, 55 Cal. 2d 192, 359 P.2d 41, 10 Cal. Rptr. 643 (1961). But see Owen v.
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D. Summary
If the partners have clearly agreed that the partnership shall last at
least for a specific term or undertaking, a prematurely dissociating part-
ner should, as under the U.P.A., be liable for damages and should not be
able to recover the goodwill component of the value of his or her partner-
ship interest. A disabled or bankrupt partner should be able to dissociate
prematurely without penalty. Also, the partners should be able to com-
pel liquidation in the situations identified in Section V(D)(4) without
penalty for premature dissociation. However, there should be no right to
dissociate prematurely without penalty merely because another partner
has exercised such a right.
Consistent with the foregoing, Sections 1.01(c), 1.02(b) and 1.04(b) of
the suggested statute penalize partners whose conduct causes premature
dissociation. A partner who withdraws or is expelled from a going part-
nership is subject not only to damages but also to loss of his share of the
going concern value of the firm. 173  Although these provisions do not
penalize partners, such as disabled partners, whose premature dissocia-
tion is not wrongful, they do not permit a partner to prematurely dissoci-
ate merely because another partner has withdrawn or been expelled for
wrongful conduct. Note that dissociating partners lose going concern
value only if the dissociation is prior to the end of an agreed term, even if
the dissociation is otherwise wrongful. The goodwill penalty is a re-
sponse to the specific situation of the agreed term and not to wrongful
conduct generally.
Cohen, 19 Cal. 2d 147, 119 P.2d 713 (1941); Vangel v. Vangel, 116 Cal. App. 2d 615, 254 P.2d 919
(1953); Drashner v. Sorenson, 75 S.D. 247, 63 N.W.2d 255 (1954). For an argument favoring impli-
cation of a term only from specific evidence see Hillman, supra note 6, at 25-26. It may be that
findings of agreed terms on the basis of scant evidence are motivated by a desire to avoid the high
costs associated with the U.P.A. liquidation right. See the cases cited supra notes 170-7 1. If so, such
findings will be unnecessary under statutory provisions like those suggested in this article that permit
liquidation in more limited circumstances than under the U.P.A.
173. There may be a serious question as to the components of going concern value or goodwill as
distinguished from other aspects of the value of the firm. See supra note 99. See also Pav-Saver
Corp. v Vasso Corp., 143 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 493 N.E.2d 423 (1986), discussed supra notes 93-94
(good will under U.P.A. § 38(2)(c)(II) includes value of patents wrongful partner contributed to
firm). Nevertheless, this provision is useful in that it gives a court discretion to use valuation to
compensate for the difficulty of assessing appropriate damages against the dissociating partner. See
text accompanying note 153. It is doubtful that a more exact standard accomplishing this purpose
could be devised.
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VII. CONTRACTING AROUND THE STANDARD FORM:
PROHIBITING DISSOCIATION
A. Defining the Issues
The preceding two Parts described the appropriate features of the stat-
utory standard form as to partner dissociation. Those Parts conclude
that the partners should have the power to dissociate, except that dissoci-
ation should be penalized if departure occurs prior to the termination of
an agreed minimum term or undertaking. Under the U.P.A., the power
to dissociate by dissolving the partnership is absolute.'74 In this Part, I
consider whether the partners ought to be able to contract around the
power to dissociate at will.
It is important to clarify at the outset precisely what type of agreement
is at issue. The partners clearly should be able to vary statutory dissocia-
tion rights that affect only the partners themselves by provisions in the
partnership agreement.' 75 The issue here is whether the parties should
be able by their agreement to wholly supplant the statutory power to
dissociate. 176 In light of the high costs of illiquidity,' 77 the parties pre-
174. Several states have qualified the power to dissolve the partnership in the event of with-
drawal or death. As to non-dissolution on partner withdrawal, see ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-42-601
(1987) (adding to the official version of U.P.A. § 29 that dissociation "shall not effect a dissolution of
the partnership in contravention or violation of the agreement between the partners") and § 65-131
(omitting U.P.A. § 31(2)); CAL. CORP. CODE § 15031 (West 1977) (adding to the official version of
U.P.A. § 31 a subsection (7) that provides that a written partnership agreement signed by all the
partners may prevent dissolution upon the "withdrawal of a partner or admission of a new part-
ner"); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 2821 and 2826 (Supp. 1987) (partner may withdraw prematurely only for
just cause, and such withdrawal does not dissolve the partnership); see also Osborne v. Workman,
273 Ark. 538, 621 S.W.2d 478 (1981); Cagnolatti v. Guinn, 140 Cal. App. 3d 42, 189 Cal. Rptr. 151
(1983); Bunch v. Quin-L Baton Rouge Partnership, 424 So.2d 1210 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 429
So.2d 131 (La. 1983). Note that the California statute preserves U.P.A. § 31(2), providing for disso-
lution by express will in contravention of the agreement. As to nondissolution on death of a partner,
see ALA. CODE § 10-8-91(4) (1980); CAL. CORP. CODE § 15031(4) (West 1977); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 14-8-31 (a)(5) (1986); IOWA CODE § 544.31(4) (West Supp. 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56-331(d)
(1983); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-12-61(4) (Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-61(4) (1982); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 54, § 231(4) (1969); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 31(4) (Vernon 1970).
175. The partners' rights under U.P.A. §§ 38 and 42, the principal sections controlling rights
among the partners, are subject to contrary agreement. Note, however, that variations restricting
payment to the partners have been strictly construed. See supra text accompanying note 14.
176. There may be a question in some cases whether the agreement wholly prevents withdrawal
or only restricts it. For analogous discussions in the corporate area compare Allen v. Biltmore
Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418, 141 N.E.2d 812 (1957) (disparity between option
exercise price and market value of corporate stock did not invalidate transfer restriction because
transfer not prohibited) with Rafe v. Hindin, 29 A.D.2d 481, 288 N.Y.S.2d 662, aff'd mem., 23
N.Y.2d 759, 244 N.E.2d 469, 296 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1968) (consent restriction on transfer invalid as
restriction on alienation of stock). In light of the conclusion in this Part that even total prohibition
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sumably have not, in fact, made such an agreement. The presumption is
overcome if the parties have entered into an apparently comprehensive
agreement that provides for dissociation only in specific circumstances or
an agreement that expressly precludes dissociation in some circum-
stances. A sketchy agreement that does not provide for dissociation
should not be interpreted as supplanting the statutory provisions. Most
importantly, the fact that the partners agreed to an unexpired minimum
term or undertaking does not necessarily mean that they intended wholly
to prohibit dissociation, as distinguished from merely penalizing it.178
The question whether the partners should be able to dissociate
notwithstanding their agreement to the contrary is separate from
whether the partners should have continuing obligations under their
agreement to furnish capital or services. Traditional contract rules re-
garding discharge should be applied to such agreements. Even if these
rules justify discharge or prohibit specific performance of service obliga-
tions, however, that does not mean that the parties should be able to
demand, in effect as promisees, repayment of investments they have al-
ready made and release from responsibility for partnership debts. 179
B. Evaluation of Reasons for Non-Enforcement of Prohibitions
on Withdrawal
This Section evaluates some of the reasons that have been and might
be given for refusing to enforce the parties' express agreement not to per-
mit dissociation at will.
1. Distinctions Between Corporation and Partnership
The corporate standard form, unlike the partnership standard form,
on the right of dissociation should be permitted in most situations, I will not explore where the line
between variation and elimination of the dissociation right should be drawn in the partnership area.
177. See discussion supra § V(C)(3).
178. One commentator argues against this position. See Hillman, supra note 63, at 731: "An
agreement concerning duration, in short, should effectively deny a partner the power to unilaterally
cause a premature dissolution through an expression of will." While Professor Hillman notes imme-
diately prior to this statement that "'[s]everal possibilities may be addressed in bargaining" including
giving partners the power but not the right to dissolve, id. at 731 n.201, he says that partners una-
ware of the fact that the partnership necessarily dissolves under the U.P.A. would assume that the
partnership would last for the full term. However, I believe that it is more likely, in light of the high
costs of illiquidity, that the partners, even in ignorance of the U.P.A., would assume that they were
not completely locked into the partnership for the full term.
179. As to the relationship between specific performance and the power to dissociate, see supra
text accompanying notes 66-69.
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does not provide for a power to dissociate. Thus, a shareholder may be
able to escape, in the absence of contrary agreement, only by selling his
or her shares to a third party. Do the differences between the corpora-
tion and the partnership justify permitting illiquidity in the former but
mandating an escape route in the other?
Without a buyout right, partnership interests, unlike corporate shares,
are wholly illiquid."' ° But this alone is not a major distinction between a
partnership and a closely-held corporation because interests in the latter
normally cannot be transferred apart from a sale of the entire business.
Perhaps more importantly, without statutory withdrawal provisions,
partners, unlike corporate shareholders, are personally at risk for busi-
ness debts. Although close corporation shareholders frequently guaran-
tee particular corporate obligations, these guarantees are more limited
than partners' open-ended exposure to corporate debts. Also, although
corporate shareholders may be personally liable for business debts under
a veil-piercing theory, this liability normally extends only to active share-
holders"' who can avoid the liability prospectively merely by withdraw-
ing personal services from the business even in the absence of a power to
dissociate.
Although there are differences between the plight of partners and
shareholders related to the need for a power to dissociate, these differ-
ences go only to the degree to which the owners are exposed to risk in the
usual case. A corporate shareholder may invest his entire assets in the
business while a partner may make a relatively small investment in a
passive enterprise that is unlikely to incur substantial liabilities.' 82 The
differences between corporations and partnerships are therefore more rel-
evant in determining the appropriate statutory standard form than to the
enforceability of a specific agreement. They do not justify refusing to
honor partners' deliberate choice of a corporate-type business structure.
2. Providing for Unanticipated Costs of Illiquidity
As discussed earlier,183 the costs of illiquidity may be high. Partners
180. See supra §§ III(B)(2) and IV(F)(1).
181. See Krivo Industrial Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chemical Corp., 483 F.2d 1098
(5th Cir. 1973), modified, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1974); Fisser v. Int'l Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.
1960).
182. This observation has been made in noting the similarity between veil-piercing as to individ-
ual and corporate shareholders in the close corporation setting. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANAL-
YSIS OF LAw 381 (3d ed. 1986).
183. See supra § V(C)(2).
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who agree to prohibit dissociation would seem to have taken these costs
into account, but this is not necessarily the case. A partnership, like any
business association, is normally a long-term relationship. Changing cir-
cumstances might greatly increase the costs of illiquidity. The partners
do not have perfect foresight. Even if they did, contracting for every
eventuality is prohibitively expensive, and the cost of detailed dissocia-
tion provisions' 84 normally outweigh the benefits perceived in the light of
the harmonious atmosphere at formation. Thus, the failure to plan for a
particular contingency does not necessarily mean that the parties in-
tended not to provide for it, but may mean only that the costs of planning
for the contingency outweighed the expected benefits of such planning.
The power to dissociate thus serves as a kind of escape valve that ac-
comodates imperfections in planning.
The problem with this line of reasoning is that it gives insufficient
weight to the parties' agreement. While the partners may not have antic-
ipated a particular event or intended that a partner be locked in whatever
the cost, they may also have intended and planned for this result after
taking into account the costs of illiquidity. For example, a partnership
engaged in the business of buying raw land for investment purposes may
require little or no commitment of human capital by non-managing, capi-
tal-contributing partners. Hence, illiquidity may impose relatively small
costs on these partners, while dissociation may be quite costly because it
may facilitate a squeezeout or necessitate sale of the partnership assets
under poor market conditions. Even when illiquidity is costly, the part-
ners may have concluded that the potential cost of liquidity was even
higher, as where the partners have committed substantial capital to an
enterprise with a long-term payoff so that the damages from premature
termination may be particularly difficult to measure. 185
For the foregoing reasons, enforcement of a non-dissociation agree-
ment is not necessarily inappropriate. Moreover, viewing the situation
ex ante, prohibiting the partners from entering into a binding agreement
that precludes dissociation may deter otherwise efficient arrangements or
necessitate the use of cumbersome and inadequate protective devices
184. The costs of entering into customized agreements are discussed supra notes 5-9.
185. See J. STORY, supra note 56, at 397 (opposing power to dissolve in part because damages
may be inadequate); Hillman, supra note 63, at 719 (specific enforcement of partnership may be
preferable to dissolution at will because promisees are in a position to know about the adequacy of
damages). Hillman relies on Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979)
which makes a similar point about specific enforcement of contracts generally.
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(such as bonding) where the costs of the power to dissociate at will are
likely to be high.
A good illustration of the problems involved in not permitting the par-
ties to draft around dissociation is provided by Pay-Saver Corp. v. Vasso
Corp. 186 In Pay-Saver, the partnership agreement included a liquidated
damages clause to deter unilateral termination by a partner that contrib-
uted essential patents and the services of its shareholder. The partners
intended this provision to protect the shareholder of the other partner,
who had made a heavy personal commitment to the venture. When the
patent-contributing partner terminated, the court, in an effort to effectu-
ate the U.P.A. scheme of buyout and continuation on wrongful dissolu-
tion, not only enforced the liquidated damages clause, but refused to
apply a provision in the partnership agreement that the patents be re-
turned on termination. The court further characterized the value of the
patents as goodwill that need not be included in the buyout price. How-
ever, the court would not go so far as to set off the damages against the
value of the terminating partner's interest rather than permitting pay-
ment of damages by installments over a ten-year period as provided in
the agreement. The nonterminating partner was therefore forced to bear
the risk that the terminating partner might become insolvent and fail to
pay the damages. Thus, even elaborate drafting and a willing court were
not enough to protect against harm from premature dissociation.
3. The Incorporation Option
One can argue that if the parties really want to be locked into a busi-
ness relationship they could simply incorporate and adopt the standard
corporate form. The problem with this reasoning is that incorporation
may involve substantial costs. The parties may have to sacrifice the flow-
through features of partnership taxation, draft elaborately for partner-
ship-type management and share transfer restrictions, and enter into cus-
tomized guarantees with creditors in order to secure credit at reasonable
cost. These costs should not be forced on the partners unless permitting
non-dissociation agreements in the partnership involves greater costs.
C. The Judicial "Escape Valve"
Although the partners should not necessarily be able to avoid a non-
dissociation agreement, it is sometimes appropriate to permit a partner to
186. 143 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 493 N.E.2d 423 (1986). This case is also discussed supra notes 93-94.
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dissociate despite an apparently inconsistent agreement. These situations
should be dealt with through limited judicial dissociation. 187
Perhaps some guidance as to the standards that should be applied by
the courts can be drawn from the corporate context. The courts gener-
ally can order corporate dissolution or other relief in the event of dead-
lock' 88 or manager misconduct. 189 Unless the partners have some right
of exit in these situations, the exploitation of their co-partners or the pro-
longed foundering of the business may expose the partners to particularly
high costs of illiquidity. Moreover, the partners probably did not antici-
pate these situations at the harmonious outset of their relationship.
Courts should order liquidation of the partnership notwithstanding the
partnership agreement if the partnership business is no longer viable be-
cause it has become unlawful or a losing proposition. The partners obvi-
ously could not have intended to carry on in these circumstances.
Liquidation in these situations is similar to discharge of contractual obli-
gations by reason of the impossibility of further performance. 19°
In decreeing a right of exit in the above situations, the courts must
take adequate account of the partners' explicit rejection of a power to
dissociate by focusing on the expectations of the partners. 19' Also, the
court should tailor the remedy to the particular circumstances, and not
order liquidation if this can be avoided by expelling or assessing damages
against the misbehaving partner. 192 The mere fact that the partnership
187. Note that judicial determination is necessary as to other events that trigger dissociation,
such as partner incapacity. Unlike the situations discussed in this Section, those determinations
operate only in the absence of contrary agreement.
188. Deadlock is a particular risk in the partnership in view of the small number of members and
the fact that the partners generally have a veto power as to extraordinary matters under U.P.A.
§ 18(h).
189. See, e.g., REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.30 (dissolution on shareholder petition on the
grounds of deadlock, controlling persons have acted in "illegal, oppressive or fraudulent" manner, or
"corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted").
190. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 262 (1981).
191. For recent cases considering shareholder expectations in the context of close corporation
dissolution see Gardstein v. Kemp & Beatley, 64 N.Y.2d 63, 484 N.Y.S. 2d 799, 473 N.E.2d 1173
(1984); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983).
192. A "last-resort" approach has also been applied to close corporation dissolution. The
MODEL Bus. CORP. CLOSE CORP. Supp. includes somewhat broader grounds for dissolution or
other relief than the general statute, but permits dissolution only as a last resort. Close Corporation
Supplement Section 16(b)(9)-(10), 37 Bus. LAW. 269, 301 (1981). N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104-(a)
(b) (1986) requires the court, before ordering dissolution, to consider whether "liquidation of the
corporation is the only feasible means" of protecting the shareholder. See Gardstein v. Kemp &
Beatley, 64 N.Y. 2d 63, 73, 484 N.Y.S. 2d 799, 805, 473 N.E. 2d 1173, 1179 (1984): "Implicit in this
direction [in Section 1104-(a)(b)] is that once oppressive conduct is found, consideration must be
1987]
Washington University Open Scholarship
416 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
business has been losing money should not compel liquidation where it is
evident that the partners anticipated losses, as in a tax shelter situation.
A possible objection to judicial resolution of dissociation issues is that,
as compared with dissociation at will, this remedy involves an expendi-
ture of scarce judicial resources. 193 It is not at all clear, however, that
the goal of conservation of judicial resources is achieved through a rule
permitting dissociation at will. In the first place, buyout or liquidation
often will require judicial determination of the value of the outgoing in-
terest. Moreover, there are numerous qualifications on the power to dis-
solve that require judicial oversight, including the good faith of the
dissolving partner and whether market conditions render liquidation of
assets inappropriate.194
Consistently with the foregoing, Section 1.01 of the suggested statute
provides that dissociation is subject to contrary agreement except with
respect to expulsion of a wrongful partner (Section 1.01(a)(ii)(2)). Also,
the power to compel liquidation of the partnership under Section 1.04 is
subject to contrary agreement except as to the court's power to liquidate
if the partnership has become unlawful (1.04(a)(3)), the business cannot
be carried on profitably (1.04(a)(4)), or it is not practicable to carry on
the partnership because the partners are deadlocked or because of part-
ner misconduct (1.04(a)(5)). Pursuant to Section 1.04(c), the court, in
determining whether to order liquidation, must "have due regard for the
agreement and reasonable expectations of the parties."
VIII. SUGGESTED DISSOCIATION PROVISIONS
The following dissociation provisions, intended for inclusion in a re-
vised Uniform Partnership Act, give specific form to the ideas expressed
in this Article.
given to the totality of circumstances ... to determine whether some remedy short of or other than
dissolution constitutes a feasible means of satisfying both the petitioner's expectations and the rights
and interests of any other substantial group of shareholders."
193. See Comment, Winding Up Dissolved Law Partnerships: The No-Compensation Rule and
Client Choice, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1597, 1637 (1985) (rule compensating partners of dissolved law
partnership who complete pending cases on pre-dissolution basis preserves judicial resources by
making it unnecessary for courts to become involved in allocating fees on case-by-case basis).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 51-56.
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Section 1.01: Events of Dissociation
(a) A person ceases to be a partner upon the occurrence of one or
more of the following events:
(1) Except as provided in the partnership agreement, the part-
ner withdraws by voluntary act from the partnership as
provided in subsection (b) of this Section;
(2) The partner is expelled (i) in accordance with the partner-
ship agreement; or (ii) pursuant to the entry of an order by
a court of competent jurisdiction on the ground that he has
wilfully or persistently committed a breach of the partner-
ship agreement or otherwise breached his duty to the other
partners or the partnership such that it is not reasonably
practicable to carry on the business in partnership with
him, or that it is unlawful to carry on the partnership with
him;
(3) Except as provided in the partnership agreement, the part-
ner: (i) makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors;
(ii) files a voluntary petition in bankruptcy; (iii) is the sub-
ject of an order for relief under Section 303(h) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 303(h)) or the filing of a petition
for voluntary bankruptcy under Section 301 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 301) as these provisions may be
now or hereafter amended, or an equivalent order or peti-
tion under any successor statute or code of general applica-
tion, or an equivalent order or petition under any state
insolvency act; (iv) files a petition or answer seeking for
himself any reorganization, arrangement, composition, re-
adjustment, liquidation, dissolution, or similar relief under
any statute, law, or regulation; (v) files an answer or other
pleading admitting or failing to contest the material allega-
tions of a petition filed against him in any proceeding of
this nature; or (vi) seeks, consents to, or acquiesces in the
appointment of a trustee, receiver, or liquidator of the part-
ner or of all or any substantial part of his properties;
(4) Except as provided in the partnership agreement, 120 days
after the commencement of any proceeding against the
partner seeking reorganization, arrangement, composition,
readjustment, liquidation, dissolution, or similar relief
under any statute, law, or regulation, the proceeding has
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not been dismissed, or if within 90 days after the appoint-
ment without his consent or acquiescence of a trustee, re-
ceiver, or liquidator of the general partner or of all or any
substantial part of his properties, the appointment is not
vacated or stayed or within 90 days after the expiration of
any stay, the appointment is not vacated;
(5) Except as provided in the partnership agreement, in the
case of a partner who is an individual; (i) his death; or
(ii) the entry of an order by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion adjudicating him incompetent to manage his person or
his estate;
(6) Except as provided in the partnership agreement, in the
case of a partner who is a trust or is acting as a partner by
virtue of being a trustee of a trust, the termination of the
trust, but not merely the substitution of a new trustee;
(7) Except as provided in the partnership agreement, in the
case of a partner that is a separate partnership, the dissolu-
tion and commencement of winding up of the separate
partnership;
(8) Except as provided in the partnership agreement, in the
case of a partner that is a corporation, the filing of a certifi-
cate of its dissolution or the equivalent for the corporation
or the revocation of its charter and the lapse of 90 days
after notice to the corporation of revocation without a rein-
statement of its charter;
(9) Except as provided in the partnership agreement, in the
case of an estate, the distribution by the fiduciary of the
estate's entire interest in the partnership;
(10) Any event specified in the partnership agreement as result-
ing in a person ceasing to be a partner;
(11) Except as provided in the partnership agreement or an
agreement between the purchaser and the partner, pursu-
ant to the entry of an order by a court of competent juris-
diction on the application of the purchaser of a partner's
interest under Sections 27 or 28 (i) after the termination of
the specified term or particular undertaking; or (ii) at any
time if the partnership was a partnership at will when the
interest was assigned or when the charging order was
issued.
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(b) A partner may dissociate from a partnership by voluntary act at
any time by giving 90 days' written notice to the other partners, or by
such other notice as is specified in writing in the partnership agreement.
(c) Except as provided in the partnership agreement, if an event of
dissociation violates the partnership agreement or occurs as a result of
otherwise wrongful conduct of the partner, the partnership may recover
from the dissociating partner damages for such wrongful conduct or
breach, including the reasonable cost of obtaining replacement of the
services the withdrawn partner was obligated to perform, and may offset
the damages against the amount otherwise distributable to him, in addi-
tion to pursuing any remedies provided for in the partnership agreement
or otherwise available under applicable law. Except as provided in the
partnership agreement, in the case of a partnership for a definite term or
particular undertaking, a partner's dissociation by voluntary act pursu-
ant to subsection (b) of this Section before the expiration of that term or
undertaking is a breach of the partnership agreement.
Comments
This section is based on Section 402 of the Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act (1985). Note that "dissociation" is used instead of "with-
drawal" to clarify the statute's concern with the legal consequences of
termination of the partner's association with the firm rather than with
the partner's voluntary conduct. Section 1.04, below, specifies events
that justify sale of the partnership business; and Section 1.06 discusses
the circumstances under which the partnership dissolves. The conse-
quences of events of dissociation are specified in Sections 1.02 and 1.03.
If the partnership is for an agreed term or undertaking, dissociation by
voluntary act pursuant to subsection (b) prior to expiration of the term is
penalized under subsection (c) even if another partner has a right to dis-
sociate without penalty. However, there is no penalty if the partner dis-
sociates under other provisions of this Section or if the partner has a
right to compel sale of assets under Section 1.04.191
As is discussed in Part VII, the statutory events of dissociation other
than expulsion are subject to contrary provision in the partnership
agreement.
Expulsion of a partner is permitted not only pursuant to agreement,
195. The circumstances under which premature dissociation should be permitted without pen-
alty are discussed supra § VI(B).
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but also by court order under Section 1.01(a)(2). 196 A similar result may
be reached under the current version of the Uniform Partnership Act if
Section 38(2) is deemed to be triggered by misconduct other than prema-
ture withdrawal, 9 7 because the partners would be able to buy out the
misbehaving partner at book value (i.e., not including goodwill) less
damages caused by the misconduct. Section 1.01 states the grounds of
expulsion for misconduct in terms similar to those for dissolution under
current U.P.A. Section 32 (1)(c) and (d), and so invokes the standards
currently applied under those U.P.A. subsections, except that the pro-
posed statute makes clear that expulsion is justified only when it is im-
practicable to continue the business with the expellee. Misconduct may
also justify liquidation by judicial decree under Section 1.04(f), below.
An assignee of a partner's interest can force the assignor's dissociation
and thereby obtain any funds to which the assignee is entitled upon
buyout of the assignor. This approach is less drastic than current U.P.A.
§ 32 (2) which permits the assignee to obtain dissolution and liquidation
of the partnership.
The notice of dissociation minimizes disruption caused by the need to
secure a replacement for the services, credit and capital of the exiting
partner and adds certainty as to whether a partner who ceases participa-
tion in the business remains a partner. The ninety-day period specifies
the time as of which the dissociation is effective, so premature dissocia-
tion is not possible by reason of violation of the notice provision. If the
partner dissociates in the sense of ceasing to act in the partnership busi-
ness without providing the requisite notice, this may constitute a breach
of a service obligation that exists under the partnership agreement.
Section 1.02: Rights of Dissociated Partner to Value of Interest and
Indemnification
(a) Subject to subsections (b) and (d) of this Section and to Section
1.04, a person who ceases to be a partner pursuant to Section 1.01 shall
have the right to demand payment for the fair value of his partnership
interest, with interest on such fair value from the date of the demand, or
such other amount, if any, as shall be determined in accordance with the
provisions of the partnership agreement. If no agreement is reached for
the purchase of the interest within ninety days of the demand, the de-
manding partner may commence an action in the court for the determi-
196. Expulsion for misconduct is not subject to contrary agreement of the partners for the rea-
sons discussed following note 189, supra.
197. See supra note 46.
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nation of the amount due for his interest. The court shall thereupon
proceed to determine the amount due in a manner which it finds to be
appropriate under the circumstances. Upon the determination of the
amount due, the court shall issue a decree providing that the partnership
shall within ninety days purchase the interest of the demanding partner
for such amount, and further providing that if the partnership shall not
have purchased the demanding partner's interest within such period, the
court shall order a sale of the assets of the partnership pursuant to Sec-
tion 1.04.
(b) A partner who has been expelled pursuant to Section
1.01(a)(2)(ii), or has dissociated by voluntary act pursuant to Section
1.01(b), (i) shall be liable for damages caused by his wrongful conduct
and for his breach of the partnership agreement as provided in Section
1.01(c); and (ii) if the dissociation is prior to the termination of an agreed
term or undertaking shall not be entitled to be paid any amount repre-
senting the goodwill of the business.
(c) Except as provided in the partnership agreement, the demanding
partner shall be entitled to be indemnified by the partnership against all
liabilities for which the partner is held liable by reason of having been a
partner in the partnership.
(d) Except as provided in the partnership agreement, the court may
for good cause shown permit all or part of the purchase price for any or
all shares purchased to be paid over a period of time not exceeding five
years, provided that (i) as to any portion of the purchase price for which
payment is deferred as herein provided, interest shall be awarded at the
legal rate; and (ii) that the partnership secure the payment by such bond,
if any, as the court may determine. A partner who has dissociated by
voluntary act pursuant to Section 1.01(b) prior to the expiration of an
agreed term or undertaking need not be paid any portion of the value of
his interest until the expiration of the term or undertaking, provided the
partnership secures payment by such bond, if any, as the court may
determine.
Comment
This provision is designed to achieve the optimal balance between fa-
cilitating continuation of the business and fairness to the dissociating
partner. The basic measure of the buyout price ("fair value"), the provi-
sion for deferred payments, and the procedure for determination of the
price are drawn from the Hetherington and Dooley proposal for close
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corporation buyouts.198 The penalties against wrongful partners and the
provision for deferred payment to partners who dissociate prematurely
are drawn from current U.P.A. § 38(2).119
Section 1. 03: Dissociating Partner's Power to Bind the Partnership and
Liability to Third Persons after Dissociation
A person who ceases to be a partner under Section 1.01 shall not be
personally liable as a partner for any partnership debt incurred, and shall
not have the power to bind the partnership, after one of the events speci-
fied in subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1.01, provided the other party to
the transaction:
(a) was a creditor of the partnership at the time of such event or had
extended credit to the partnership within two years prior to such time
and, in either case, had no knowledge or notice of the person's ceasing to
be a partner; or
(b) though he had not so extended credit, had nevertheless known,
prior to such event that the person was a partner and, having no knowl-
edge or notice of the occurrence of such event, the event had not been
advertised in a newspaper of general circulation in the place (or in each
place if more than one) at which the partnership business was regularly
carried on.
Comment
This section, which is drawn from current U.P.A. § 35, provides a
method of escaping liability for post-dissociation partnership debts with-
out dissolution of the partnership.2" It reaches the same basic result as
under current law where the partnership is continued after a partner
dissociation.2"1
Section L 04: Sale of Assets
(a) The assets of the partnership shall be sold, the proceeds applied
to discharge its liabilities, and the surplus applied to pay in cash the net
amount owing to the respective partners, upon the occurrence of any of
the following circumstances:
(1) Except as provided in the partnership agreement, by the ex-
press will of a majority in number of the partners who have
198. See Hetherington and Dooley, supra note 6, at 56-58.
199. This Section clarifies that the bond is required to secure nonpayment of the value of the
departing partner's interest during the remainder of the agreed term. See supra note 59.
200. The provision therefore fills a gap in current statutes that permit dissociation without disso-
lution (see supra note 174) but provide for termination of agency only in the event of dissolution.
201. See text accompanying notes 33-34.
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not assigned their interests or suffered them to be charged
for their separate debts;
(2) Except as provided in the partnership agreement, the part-
nership fails to perform its obligations to the dissociating
partner pursuant to Section 1.02;
(3) An event has occurred that makes it unlawful for the busi-
ness of the partnership to be carried on;
(4) The business of the partnership can no longer be carried on
profitably for the foreseeable future;
(5) The termination of the definite term or particular undertak-
ing specified in the agreement unless, upon such termina-
tion, the partners continue the partnership business
pursuant to [U.P.A.] Section 23;
(6) Pursuant to a decree of court on the grounds that it is not
reasonably practicable to carry on the partnership because
the partners are deadlocked or because a partner has
wilfully and persistently breached the partnership agree-
ment or otherwise breached his duties to the partnership or
the other partners.
(b) If the assets of the partnership are sold pursuant to subsection
(a)(6) of this Section, the partnership may recover from any partner
whose breach of duty causes such sale damages resulting from such
breach, and may offset the damages against the amount otherwise distrib-
utable to him, in addition to pursuing any remedies provided for in the
partnership agreement or otherwise available under applicable law.
(c) In entering a decree under this Section, the court shall have due
regard for the agreement and reasonable expectations of the parties.
Comments
The events specified in this section are those that cannot be resolved
merely through partner dissociation, and therefore necessitate liquidation
of the partnership business. Consistent with the discussion in Section
VI(B)(3), sale in these circumstances does not trigger the penalties for
premature dissociation. Also, consistent with the discussion in Section
VII(C), the right to compel sale pursuant to subsections (a)(3) through
(a)(6) is not subject to contrary provision in the partnership agreement.
However, subsection (c) requires the court, in ordering sale, to take into
account provisions of the partnership agreement, including those that
provide for a term or that do not allow dissociation. The remedy against
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a partner whose breach of duty results in sale of the partnership parallels
that against a wrongfully dissociating partner under Section 1.01(c).
Section 1.05: Winding Up
(a) Except as provided in the partnership agreement, upon the occur-
rence of an event specified in Section 1.04 the partners shall cease to be
associated in the carrying on of the partnership. The partnership shall
continue until the winding up of the partnership affairs is completed, at
which time the partnership shall terminate. Until termination the part-
ners shall be associated in the winding up of the partnership.
(b) Except as provided in the partnership agreement, the partners
who have not wrongfully caused an event under Section 1.04 have the
right to wind up the partnership affairs, including the right to convey any
real property of the partnership; provided, however, that any partner, his
legal representative or his assignee, upon cause shown, may obtain wind-
ing up by the court.
Comment
Whether the partnership is engaged in winding up is particularly im-
portant with regard to the partners' power to bind the partnership during
the winding up period. This section clarifies that the partnership enters
the winding up period not upon any partner dissociation, as under cur-
rent U.P.A. §§ 29 and 30, but only upon occurrence of one of the events
that justifies sale of the partnership business. This is, in effect, consistent
with current law. Although the U.P.A. now provides for winding up
even if there is only a technical dissolution and the partnership business
continues as before, in fact the winding up affects only the "old" partner-
ship-i.e., the one that included the dissociated partner-while the re-
maining partners are engaged in "carrying on" the new, post-dissolution
partnership. Providing for winding up only when the partnership is, in
fact, to be sold, eliminates this confusing state of affairs.
It is true that the business of the partnership might, in fact, continue
after a sale of assets under this Section. But because it will not usually be
possible to predict with certainty the future of a business that is about to
be sold in the absence of an agreement providing for this situation, it is
appropriate to regard the "carrying on" of the business as suspended
during the presale period.
The language concerning who may wind up and the extent of their
powers is drawn from current U.P.A. § 37, and therefore invokes the
substantial body of case law under that Section.
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Section 1. 06: Dissolution of the Partnership
Subject to provisions of the partnership agreement limiting the circum-
stances under which the partnership entity dissolves, the partnership en-
tity shall dissolve when, following dissociation of one or more partners
pursuant to Section 1.01 or sale of the assets of the business pursuant to
Section 1.04, the business of the partnership is either not carried on or is
carried on solely by one or more persons not partners in the dissolved
partnership.
Comments
This section relegates dissolution of the partnership entity to a residual
role, in stark contrast to its fundamental role under current law. As is
discussed in Section V(F), dissolution is necessary only to indicate the
situations in which the continuity of the business has been disrupted to
the extent that the parties would not expect rights and obligations of the
old firm to carry over to the new one. For the reasons discussed in Sec-
tion V(F)(3), the partnership agreement may limit, but may not expand,
the circumstances under which the partnership dissolves.
This provision may affect whether a general partnership is an "associa-
tion" and therefore treated as a corporation for tax purposes.2 °2 Current
Treasury Regulations provide that an association is a business organiza-
tion that includes three or more of four corporate characteristics: con-
tinuity of life, centralized management, limited liability, and free
transferability of interests.2 °3 Because proposed Section 1.06 gives a gen-
eral partnership corporate-type continuity of life, a general partnership
organized under this statute would be taxed as a corporation if it also
had two other "association" characteristics. Although the risk that a
general partnership would have these other characteristics is slight, this
problem should be taken into account in considering the appropriateness
of this provision. In light of the advantages of this provision discussed in
Section V(F)(3) and the artificiality of the dissolution concept under the
U.P.A., the optimal approach would be reconsideration of the tax defini-
tion of a corporation. In all events, the parties can draft around this
provision in specific circumstances where the partnership has other "as-
sociation" characteristics.
202. Internal Revenue Code § 7701(a)(3) defines a "corporation" for tax purposes to include any
"association", and § 7701(a)(2) defines a "partnership" so as to exclude "corporation."
203. See Treasury Regulations §§ 301.7701-2; Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729 (Ct. Cl.
1975).
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Comments on Other U.P.A. Dissolution Provisions
A complete revision of the U.P.A. dissolution provisions is beyond the
scope of this Article. However, a few changes that follow from the above
sections should be noted.
(1) Current U.P.A. §§ 33, 34 and 35 should be revised to provide
that the scope of a nondissociating partner's authority to bind the part-
nership is limited only after an event specified in proposed Section 1.04.
(2) Current § 36 should be revised to apply to any dissociated part-
ner, and not merely after dissolution of the partnership.
(3) Current §§ 40 and 43 should be revised to apply to distribution
upon sale of the assets of the partnership under proposed Section 1.04.
IX. CONCLUSION
I have considered in this Article two broad questions concerning part-
ner dissociation: First, what should the statutory standard form provide?
And, second, what should be the effect of complete and incomplete part-
nership agreements? In light of the high costs associated with illiquidity
of partnership interests, a partner's power to dissociate from the firm at
will is desireable in many situations. It is also necessary, however, to
take into account the costs that can be inflicted on the partners who do
not wish to dissociate. Fashioning an approach that appropriately bal-
ances costs and benefits in particular situations requires precise thinking
about the elements of and various approaches to partner dissociation.
This "scalpel" approach contrasts with the U.P.A.'s "dynamite" ap-
proach of blasting the partnership apart, whatever the cost to the part-
ners as a whole, in order to achieve the dissociation of a single partner.
I have designed the statutory standard form dissociation provisions
outlined in this article specifically for the partnership. They are consis-
tent with other aspects of the partnership standard form, particularly in-
cluding the personal liability of the partners for partnership debts. Thus,
my conclusions do not necessarily apply to corporations, whether closely
or publicly held. An analysis of the costs and benefits of dissociation in
the corporate context may well support a standard form that does not
include dissociation at will even for closely held corporations.2"
204. For the opposite conclusion see Hetherington and Dooley, supra note 6 (proposing statu-
tory withdrawal provisions for closely held corporations).
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